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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
HARMONIZING THE DISJOINTED: ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND RISK
SHARING
This dissertation consists of three essays examining the role of risk diversification
in European markets. At the economy level the first two essays seek to identify
whether economic integration efforts among European countries result in sharing risks
to consumption with regional neighbors, as opposed to global partners. At the firm
level, the third essay seeks to understand whether managers of large companies in the
United Kingdom choose less financial leverage if they are specifically compensated
with more cash bonus as opposed to other forms of performance incentives.
In Essay 1, I assess the extent to which European countries diversify consumption
risks and share them both within the European region and with major non-European
countries. I identify that an empirical model can be obtained from a standard the-
oretical risk sharing framework, that allows for a direct evaluation of the extent of
dependence of a country’s own consumption on its own output growth, on regional
output growth, and on output growth of the rest-of-world (ROW). The empirical
model helps to understand whether growing European regional economic integration
changes the patterns of regional and world risk sharing. Using data for 45 Euro-
pean and 15 ROW countries over the 1960 - 2017 sample period, I find that higher
levels of risk sharing are associated with growing European Union (EU) and Euro-
zone (EZ) membership, but Europe’s risk sharing with the ROW declines, a possible
“competition effect."
In Essay 2, I point out how the long run average increase in risk sharing due to
growing financial integration is often taken as given. Yet decoupling financial inte-
gration from economic integration at large may lead to very conflicting consequences
on risk sharing for economically integrated countries. Using stock, money and bond
markets, as well as industrial production and CPI data for European countries, I show
that financial integration and real integration point in different directions, minimizing
the ability to share consumption risks within Europe. Specifically I find that the Eu-
ropean Central Bank may have made progress towards integrating money and bond
markets, but stock markets are still highly globally influenced. Also real integration
in production and prices is low and do not differ among advanced EU and non-EU
countries. The findings give a new perspective as to why inter-country consumption
risk sharing appears low in several empirical studies.
Finally, in Essay 31, the aim of the study is to investigate whether managerial
earnings-based incentive influence firms’ leverage policy and the extent to which this
relationship is conditional on the firm earnings performance. Further, we show how
firms’ growth opportunities affect managerial cash compensation - leverage relation-
ship. The paper utilize a sample of 213 non-financial and non-utility U.K. FTSE350
firms for the period 2007 – 2015. In examining these issues, we employ several econo-
metric techniques: OLS, FE, Predicted method, and three-stage least squares (3SLS)
to robustly deal with the existing leverage – cash bonus simultaneity problem. We
find empirical support for our theoretical contention that managerial cash bonus in-
duces managers to implement lower leverage policy. We further observe that the effect
of managerial cash bonus on leverage is more pronounced in a well-performing firm.
In addition, we find that cash-motivated executives with huge unexploited growth
opportunities tend to keep low leverage level. Overall, our analyses show that the
widespread usage of earnings-based incentives in the U.K executives’ compensation
contract, partly explains the conservative debt policy of the U.K firms.
KEYWORDS: Risk sharing; economic integration; financial markets; compensation;
leverage
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Chapter 1: Risk Sharing In Europe: Regional or Global?
1.1 Introduction
The study uses a consumption-based approach to analyze the pattern of risk shar-
ing in Europe. A common definition of consumption risk sharing is the situation
whereby shocks to a country’s consumption are diversified away, being shared with
other countries (Rangvid et al., 2016). In several empirical applications, when a coun-
try’s consumption growth depends less on its own income growth but more on income
growth of the rest-of-world (ROW), then consumption risk sharing is considered to
be high. The wave of global cross-country asset holding since the mid-1980s has led
to the proliferation of research addressing the impact of financial globalization on
economic outcomes (Kose et al., 2009). However, an angle that is often not discussed
within the same framework of globalization is the fact that regional economic inte-
gration could yield separate effects on integrated countries than would globalization
outside the region. In particular I demonstrate in this paper that the impact of re-
gional economic integration and integration with ROW can be separately analyzed
in a unified model and that they largely have opposite effects.
Economic integration such as through the European Union could, among other
things, improve financial stability and economic participation in those regions. When
a common currency is involved (for instance as in the Eurozone), Obstfeld (1993) and
others have identified that this could lead to less transactions costs and improve trade
and financial market activity, which in turn could allow economic agents in various
countries to smooth their consumption. By taking a new estimation approach —
decomposing the extent to which a country’s own consumption growth depends on
its own output growth, regional output growth (through regional integration) and
ROW output growth (through trade and financial openness) — the paper provides
a way of isolating feedback effects of regional integration in particular and “residual"
globalization with ROW, in one framework.
The paper finds that taken together, the periods in which countries joined the
European Union (EU) and/or adopted the Euro are associated with higher levels
of consumption risk sharing. Specifically in the periods before EU membership a 1
percent increase in regional output growth correlated with a .251 percent decrease
in consumption growth whereas the periods after EU membership correlate with a
.08 percent increase in the same. It is possible that a country that is integrated
into the "region" is able to accumulate more from cross asset ownership to increase
consumption, whereas at the same time, non-participants in the region experience less
inward FDI and asset inflow, leading to slower growth in their consumption. Some
evidence also point to the cardinal role of the Maastricht treaty as an important
catalyst for greater risk sharing within the European region.
In a closely related article to this paper, Ferrari and Rogantini Picco (2016) specif-
ically evaluate the role of the Euro adoption on consumption smoothing by firstly
creating a counterfactual dataset of macroeconomic variables via a Synthetic Control
Method. The authors then recourse to the Asdrubali et al. (1996) risk sharing decom-
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position (discussed under Related Literature) and find that the adoption of the Euro
has actually reduced members’ ability to smooth consumption risks. That finding
however does not consider the role of the EU simultaneously. The analyses in this
paper deviate from this path and allow for more insightful identification of impacts
not only through the the Euro adoption, but also through the EU arrangements,
structural breaks, and “similar country" comparisons. My finding that risk sharing
increased in the EMU is however confirmed by Christev and Melitz (2013) who uses
the role of the EMU in minimizing consumption volatility as a measure of risk shar-
ing. It is worth mentioning however that the paper does not assume that risk sharing
is the reason why countries integrate/globalize. For instance countries may integrate
with the region or the world in order to take advantage of profit opportunities or to
ward off competitive threats (Christev and Melitz, 2013).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents related literature,
Section 1.3 provides a brief theory and derivation of the empircal model. The data
used is described in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5 I present a depiction of the extent of
regional & time variations in risk sharing in Europe while detailing the key regression
estimates in Section 1.6. I also include robustness checks in section 1.7 and wrap up
the paper with Conclusions in Section 1.8.
1.2 Related Literature
The impact of economic integration is often analyzed in the context of Optimum
Currency Areas (OCA) criteria. The OCA theory, inspired by Mundell (1961), stipu-
lates that the benefits of a common currency is worthwhile for countries that tend to
experience a sufficient degree of symmetric shocks and likely have synchronized busi-
ness cycles. In other words countries that experience asymmetric shocks to output do
not need to give up their independent monetary policy and ability to use exchange
rate adjustments to resolve economic imbalances, in favor of having a stable common
currency. This line of thought dominated research that sought to project if the Eu-
rozone and any new members that join the zone later would form an OCA. While
the OCA criteria emphasize the cost of joining a currency area, another strand of
research, inspired by Mundell’s later ideas (Mundell, 1973) focus on the “benefits" of
joining a currency area even if a country exhibits asynchronous cycles. One of the
main benefits is the degree of risk sharing that could be possible by joining a more
financially integrated market that allows for consumption smoothing through cross-
ownership of financial assets. In theory, complete (financial markets) would allow a
consumer to invest in Arrow-Debreu securities that yield state-independent returns
that would be used to smooth consumption. This insurance is termed consumption
risk sharing. Thus capital market developments outside a country has a tendency
to reduce the link between Home consumption and Home output if Home countries
participate in global financial markets (Kose et al., 2009; Rangvid et al., 2016).
As with the progress of the European Union, among other things, removal of
barriers to trade, capital and labor mobility tend to precede adoption of a common
currency. Risk sharing potential is not limited to currency areas. Another important
channel for consumption risk diversification is by countries trading more with other
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countries, ideally with limited barriers. Obstfeld (1993); Imbs (2004); Rangvid et al.
(2016) and others have identified that this could lead to less transactions costs and
improve trade and financial market activity and the synchronization of business cy-
cles (Frankel and Rose, 1998; Schiavo, 2008). Therefore member countries of the EU
could share risks without necessarily being members of the Euro area. However the
potential effects of openness could go either way. For instance if increased trade is
inter-industry, this could lead to more specialization and result in less synchronous
business cycles. The former argument presumes that the trade surge is intra-industry.
Thus in principle, the impact of economic integration (financial and trade at least)
on risk diversification is inconclusive. Also, insulation against domestic shocks with
openness would imply more consumption smoothing, while openness could also ex-
pose a country to foreign shocks and hence less consumption smoothing (Christev and
Melitz, 2013). Therefore the empirical impact of risk sharing when economic integra-
tion efforts such as through the European Union and Euro adoption are introduced
into the general globalization discussion cannot be known a priori.
The link between economic integration, business cycle synchronization and risk
sharing has evolved. Obstfeld (1993), Imbs (2004), Boewer et al. (2006), Schiavo
(2008) and others consider high consumption correlations across cross countries as an
indicator of high consumption risk sharing, and high GDP correlations as a measure of
business cycle synchronization. High consumption correlations imply that consumers
in each country have effectively insured against consumption risks, aided by improved
degree of financial integration. Also high GDP correlations intuitively demonstrate
similarity in business cycles. By calibrating a theoretical model, Backus et al. (1992)
predict that consumption correlation would be higher than output correlations, but
empirical evidence find the opposite outcome — the consumption correlation puzzle.
The puzzle is however less clear if lower-than-expected financial integration, various
barriers to trade, and non-traded goods are taken into account. Also comparing con-
sumption correlations to output correlation is only done by convenience due to data
challenges, but to be more accurate, consumption correlations should be compared
to GDP correlations net of investment and government consumption, since only this
part of outcome can be shared by consumers (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000; Boewer
et al., 2006).
While recent risk sharing analyses do not link business cycles synchronization with
risk sharing, but focus on the roles of “new" measures of financial and trade integration
on risk sharing, the changing implied definition of business cycle synchronization
could be inferred. Both Kose et al. (2009) and Rangvid et al. (2016) consider the
extent of decline in a country’s dependence on its own output as the measure of
risk sharing. This implies that the higher the correlation of consumption with other
country’s output the higher the extent of risk sharing. The higher correlation could
mean increased business cycle synchronization — private consumption (the largest
component of GDP) of a country grows as output of other countries grow.
Previous authors have suggested that, over time, the decline in output volatility
across countries is another measure of business cycle synchronization. For instance
Blanchard and Simon (2001), Heathcote and Perri (2004), Stock and Watson (2005)
and Del Negro and Otrok (2008) document a decline in output volatility in G7 over
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the post-Bretton Woods era. In addition Stock and Watson (2005) find that global
shocks dominate domestic shocks in explaining the decline in output volatility across
G7 countries – evidence of increased synchronization. Other evidence by Montoya
and de Haan (2008) and Schiavo (2008) on the Euro Area indicate an increase in
business cycle synchronization.
Risk sharing has been empirically analyzed in various facets. Asdrubali et al.
(1996) identifies the channels and extent of risk-sharing among US states, defined
as the extent of consumption smoothing that are attained through either capital
markets, credit markets or the federal government spending between 1963-90. The
work by Sørensen and Yosha (1998) extends the consumption smoothing channels
in Asdrubali et al. (1996) to the European Community (EC) countries and OECD
countries over the period 1966-90. Their analyses give finer insights into the sources of
cross-sectional risk sharing among US states and the EC. However, with the identified
levels of risk sharing in these and other studies (such as Rangvid et al. (2016)) being
low, Christev and Melitz (2013) casts doubts on the role of cross-country holdings of
property claims on risk sharing altogether, finding that risk sharing in the EU rather
comes through the encouragement of price competition, contestable home markets,
ability to buy insurance at home, and harmonization of regulations. In doing so, the
indirect (usual approach) of determining risk sharing — how less relative consumption
growth is correlated with related output growth — is questioned, and replaced with
a more direct method that uses the impact of economic integration on consumption
volatility.
In a closely related topic to this paper, Ferrari and Rogantini Picco (2016) specif-
ically evaluate the role of the Euro adoption on consumption smoothing by firstly
creating a counterfactual dataset of macroeconomic variables via a Synthetic Con-
trol Method. The authors then recourse to the Asdrubali et al. (1996) risk sharing
decomposition identified earlier and find that the adoption of the Euro has actually
reduced members’ ability to smooth consumption risks. Thus as far as tests for risk
sharing in the Euro area go, empirical evidence is inconclusive.
1.3 A Brief Theory and the Empirical Model
I start with the paper published by Obstfeld (1993). Obstfeld (1993) starts by
constructing an equilibrium in an economy where consumers have the same iso-elastic
utility functions and capital markets are perfectly integrated with consumption risks
being perfectly shared. In that case only systematic risks to consumption remain. 1
Obstfeld’s final model is of the form:
∆logCit = δ + ∆logCWt + it + ηit, (1.1)
1A key mechanism through which market integration works is by allowing an open-economy
where international financial integration encourages the representative country to shift away from a
low-return, safe investment to a high-return risky investment.
4
where ηit is a function that could capture innovations that cannot be insured against
due to incomplete markets (a term that can be ignored if we assume complete mar-
kets), in a regression linking country-specific consumption growth to world consump-
tion growth. Obstfeld also justifies that using differenced data in the specification
solves the empirical problem of no cointegration between logCit and logCWt. it is
the random error term.
Kose et al. (2009) extend the theoretical set-up in Obstfeld (1993). The authors
recognize that in models assuming complete markets and isoelastic utility, discounted
marginal utility between two periods are equal for any pair of countries i and j:





= λt + 1
λt
(1.2)
This implies that differences in growth of marginal utilities are not dependent upon
country-specific variables. If Z is a vector of country-specific variables, then we obtain
E(∆logcit −∆logCt|Zit) = 0 (1.3)
where C is world per capita consumption2. Eq(3) can be stated in a regression
specification as:
∆logcit −∆logCt|Zit = bZit + εit (1.4)
Together, Eq(3) and (4) suggest that if consumption risks are perfectly shared with
the world, then the growth rate of country-specific consumption and output will be
equal, making the left hand side equal zero. Or put differently, any country-specific
variables (such as Z) will not move idiosyncratic consumption (left-hand-side), and
hence b will tend towards zero. In previous literature, Z is typically replaced with
idiosyncratic income growth. Thus Eq(4) can be re-written as:





Eq(5) is a regression of deviations of own-country consumption growth ∆cit from
world consumption growth ∆ct on idiosyncratic income. A lower β implies higher
degree of risk-sharing. If consumption risk is perfectly shared, we expect β = 0. The
world growth (consumption and income) are GDP weighted averages across countries,
with the GDP weights updated each year.
Asdrubali et al. (1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998) have shown that the β
from this regression can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of consumption
risk sharing. In principle consumption risk sharing would imply that idiosyncratic
shocks to consumption are diversified away and thus shared with other countries; a
country’s own consumption growth does not significantly depend on its own income
growth.
In this paper I propose a modification that allows for evaluating consumption risk
2For my purposes the “world" is decomposed into the European region and the ROW
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sharing that directly accounts for both regional and ROW risk sharing. The essence
of Eq(5) is to “partial out" the amount of growth due to the world, but I propose that
risk sharing due to a country’s region and that of the “world" could be decomposed and
explicitly controlled for in the same regression specification. With country-specific,
regional, and world output growth being orthogonal and complementary, I am able
to track how consumption risks have been shared with the region and the world.
The regional dimension helps with explaining the effect of growing EU economic
arrangements, and the global dimension captures the effect of globalization outside
of Europe. Given the growing economic integration within Europe, the expectation
is that the correlation of country-specific consumption growth with regional output
growth should be increasing over time (positive δ in Eq(6)) and the correlation with
the world growth is expected to decline (negative γ in Eq(6)). The model used is
then of the form:
∆cit −∆ct = α + β∆yit + δ∆yrt + γ∆ywt + εit (1.6)
where ∆yrt is regional output growth and ∆ywt is world output growth.
It is possible that a country that is integrated into the European region is able
to accumulate more from cross asset ownership to increase consumption, whereas at
the same time, non-participants in the European region experience less inward FDI
and asset inflow, leading to slower growth in their consumption. In a competitive
global economy growth outside Europe is likely to draw more investment into those
regions. This might lead to less investment into Europe and a decline in the growth
of European consumption, if European countries primarily share risks within Europe.
A negative value for either δ or γ is therefore possible.
I use the 15 European Union countries (EU 15) as of 1995 (see Table 1.3 for a list
of these countries) to represent the European region. The world is also represented by
the 15 largest trading partners of European countries (see Table 1.4). The choice of
the EU 15 is inspired by the need to choose the core regional players in the goods and
financial markets over the entire sample period (1960-2017)3. The world is represented
by the top 15 trading partners of European countries published by the European
Commission in 2017. The paper further assumes that these world countries are the
major destinations for capital from Europe, and hence risk sharing through their
financial markets.
1.4 Data
The dataset is obtained from Penn World Tables 9.04 . Per capita real con-
sumption and real GDP at constant (2011) prices (in Purchasing Power Parity(PPP)
3A potential weakness is the exclusion of Russia, a top 20 trading partner for most European
countries, but given that the available data for Russia only begins in 1990, the EU 15 countries
appear to be a reasonable representation of the region for trade and financial participation (and
integration) for most European countries
4This is put together by Feenstra et al. (2015)
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terms) are used for all 45 European and 15 ROW countries in the sample comprising
of annual data over 1960-2014. Of the 45 European countries, 19 belong to the EZ.
This dataset however has missing observations (1960-1989) for 20 countries, mostly
those that recently joined the EZ and non-EU countries. In Table 1.1 I show each
of the 45 European countries, the data available and the years in which there was a
structural break (à la Bai-Perron, 2003 method) in the estimated coefficients that I
show later. 5
[Table 1.1 about here]
The dataset from Penn World Tables 9.0 (PWT) is extended to 2017, by obtaining
real consumption and GDP data from the World Bank World Development Indicators
(WDI). It is important to note that the data from PWT are in 2011 real terms whereas
data from WDI are in real 2010 terms. To convert the WDI data into PPP terms, I
obtain exchange rates (domestic currency per US dollar, period average rate) from the
International Monetary Fund’s International Financial Statistics (IFS). Additionally
I obtain PPP conversion factor data from 2015 to 2017 from IFS and convert the
series with the formula:
Series(in PPP ) = (Exchange Rate/PPP conversion factor)×Original Series
Due to data beginning in 1990 for 20 countries in the European sample, the
empirical strategy is focused more on European Union (and Eurozone) countries,
following the time variation in consumption risk sharing for the original EU countries,
and tracking this as the EU became larger. In the case where I compare outcomes
with non-EU countries, I focus on structural breaks that may have occurred in the
post-Euro adoption era. To do this, I make a generalization about the date of the
break by imposing the break dates that I find for non-EU countries that have adequate
data for the Bai-Perron test, and also the known break dates such as in 1999 and
2002 (the Euro inauguration and official adoption resp.).
Summary Statistics
In this section I provide a snapshot of basic regional characteristics using the
adoption of the Euro in 1999 as a split point. Table 1.2 presents summary statis-
tics of the levels of real per capita consumption and income, their growth rates and
population before and after the adoption of the Euro6 for countries in the EZ. For non-
5For countries with data only beginning in 1990, the Bai-Perron structural break test could not
be performed due to limited estimation sample. The Bai-Perron method and many others such
as Quant-Andrew method all trim 15% of the data. Hence the test cannot be performed in small
samples, such as for the countries in the sample with data beginning in 1990.
6Only 11 of the current 19 Euro area countries adopted it when it was officially introduced on
January 1, 1999. The remaining 8 countries had staggered adoption of the Euro. Due to this I use a
dummy categorical variable to capture exactly when the Euro was adopted to determine the proper
split shown in Table 1
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EZ countries, I choose 1999 to split that sample to allow for comparison of regional
characteristics pertaining to both groups.
[Table 1.2 about here]
The EU 15 countries are more homogeneous, with the highest levels of mean per
capita GDP and consumption before and after the adoption of the Euro. For instance
per capita GDP in the EU 15 before and after adoption of the Euro were $19,025
and $41,581 respectively, whereas the corresponding figures for the non-EU group
were $14,041 and $17,750 respectively. Remarkably, growth rates of output and
consumption were roughly 0 in non-EU countries, dominated by former Soviet Union
members prior to adoption of the Euro. However growth in consumption and output
in the post-Euro era trended decently highly at 4 percent and 5 percent respectively,
on average. This result is interesting because the surge in growth coincides with
several of these countries joining the EU and the Eurozone, a move that this paper
seeks to uncover its potential effect on risk sharing. Average population levels are
highest in the world group, as expected — the world sample includes highly populated
countries like India, China, and the United States.
[Figures 1.1 & 1.2 about here]
Looking at figure 1.1 the countries with higher correlation between regional out-
put and idiosyncratic consumption growth mostly in the Eurozone — Finland, Italy,
Spain, France, and to some extent Ireland, Belgium, Netherlands and Greece. This
is expected given the role of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 in increasing regional
integration. Amidst the economic instabilities in the 2000s, this correlation generally
dropped, with only Netherlands as an exception (see Plot 2). In these periods coun-
tries with moderate correlation were not limited to the EZ. Non-EZ EU countries
like Sweden, Bulgaria, and Denmark, as well as Turkey (a non-EU country), seem to
have similar correlations in the 2000 - 2008 period. In the period after the economic
crisis (Plot 3 in Figure 1.2) the correlations surged, but again not unique to EZ or
EU member countries, though they dominate. Notably the correlations for major
European players like the United Kingdom, Russia, and Switzerland have remained
low.
Computation of weights and key variables
This section details how the regional and world GDP per capita and consumption
per capita data are generated and used in the paper. To take into account the relative
influence of countries within each group (regional and world) on European countries’
economic integration, I weight each country’s GDP per capita by their size, proxied
by their share of the group’s total GDP. The weights are computed as:
weights = (GDPit/Total GDPt)× 100 (1.7)
where i is the country index and t is the time subscript. Thus the GDP weights are
updated from year to year. In Tables 1.3 and 1.4, I show the average of the weights
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over various sub-periods for both the regional and the world groups. After weighting,
I obtain GDP weighted average consumption per capita and output per capita for
both the regional and world groups. Finally I impute these estimates for each country
in the European sample — each country has the same time-varying regional and world
consumption per capita as well as output per capita.
[Tables 1.3 & 1.4 about here]
1.5 Regional & Time Variation in Consumption Risk Sharing
This section explores the time variation in consumption risk sharing within Europe
for each country group described in Table 1.5. Consumption risk sharing is identified
as the extent of correlation between country-specific consumption growth and each
of regional and world output growth.
[Table 1.5 about here]
From the 10-year rolling panel forecasts in Figure 1.3, panels A, E, and F are similar
since most of the EU 15 countries became the 7 core EZ and 5 periphery EZ coun-
tries. These panels are characterized by increasing regional risk sharing, as expected
– increases in regional output growth allow integrated countries higher consumption
smoothing due to more returns on capital and expanded merchandise trade. Notice-
ably however, the general forecasted trend suggests minimal regional consumption
risk sharing until the early 1990s, a decline in much of the 2000s, and a surge towards
the end of the sample. The period of decline in regional risk sharing is not surprising
due to the economic instabilities in the 2000s but from a risk sharing perspective, this
pattern could cast doubts on the robustness of Economic integration initiatives such
as the EU and EZ in the face of crisis. After all, risk sharing is most important in
the face of crisis. In all of panels A, E, and F the relationship between idiosyncratic
consumption growth and world output is forecasted to be mostly negative. The neg-
ative relationship is interpreted as depicting declining dependence on the world for
consumption smoothing. Thus with economic integration in Europe, the region and
the world might “compete" for resources so that a surge in regional growth improves
consumption smoothing while a surge in world growth seems to decline consumption
smoothing.
Panels C and D show insignificant regional risk sharing if all EU and EZ countries
are pooled together. Due to this fact, the identification strategy in this paper is to
isolate subsets of countries or use dummy variables to uncover effects that vary by EU
or EZ members, specific years of EU membership, OECD membership, among others.
Panel B shows an increase in regional risk sharing by other EU member countries,
many of which joined the EU in 2004. Prior to this, these countries shared more
risks with the world than with the European region. Non-EU countries (panels G
and H) are characterized by high dependence on own-country output growth. The
more advanced (OECD) non-EU countries show sustained minimal levels of regional
risk sharing and a stable negative correlation with the world. Less advanced non-EU
countries (panel H) exhibit marked volatile behavior within limited sample period
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1996-2017. An overall pattern that may be observed from all panels is that as the EU
expands, so does regional consumption smoothing. As Europe strengthens through
integration, less participation with the world seems to lead to marked consumption
dis-smoothing of European countries with the world.
[Figure 1.3 about here]
1.6 Estimation and Regression Results
The section provides regression estimates that detail the major findings of the
identification strategy employed - splitting samples into countries that have joined
the EU and/or have adopted the Euro currency as opposed to those that have not
joined the EU and/or the EZ. Firstly, I introduce dummy variables for when a country
joined the EU and/or the EZ, to identify the impact of growing economic integration.
Afterwards, inspired by the time-variation in the levels of consumption risk sharing
in Figures 1.1 & 1.2, I conduct structural break tests to identified major shifts in the
estimated coefficients. A major challenge encountered is the difficulty in conducting
the tests within the panel regression framework7. The approach taken then is to
conduct country-specific break tests and use common break points across countries
to inform the specification of break points within panels. This approach provides a
good approximation, as robustness checks showed that switching from this to known
break dates does not meaningfully alter the signs and magnitudes of estimates.
Risk Sharing in the EU and EZ
The basic goal of the paper is to identify the extent to which growing economic
integration in Europe through increased participation/membership in the European
Union and the Eurozone affect risk sharing. A Dummy Variables approach is used
to take into account the duration of EU and EZ membership. The “interaction"
of the dummy variables with the regressors give the desired effects at the country-
specific, regional, and world levels. I first attempt to uncover how growing economic
integration overall for the full sample and for the 28 EU countries who joined the EU
at various times influence risk sharing. For the estimation, I define dummy variables
which equal 1 for the period during which a country is in the EU and/or EZ and 0
otherwise. Finally, I estimate panel regressions and introduce interaction terms to
capture the desired effects. The regressions are of the form:
∆cit −∆ct = α + β∆yit + δ∆yrt + γ∆ywt +Dk + φ1(∆yit ×Dk) + φ2(∆yrt ×Dk)
+φ3(∆ywt ×Dk) + εit
(1.8)
7It might be possible to do this for known breaks, but to do flexible tests such as the Bai-Perron
(2003), the panel framework is difficult to implement. Such tests are often conducted for time-series
at the country-by-country level
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where ∆yr,t is regional output growth, ∆yw,t is world output growth and the next
three terms are interactions with the EU and/or EZ dummies — each Dk included
captures the change in estimated coefficients for the periods where countries were EU
and/or EZ members in the respective regressions.
The results of the baseline regression are shown in Table 1.6. For the full sample,
dependence on own country output growth does not vary with economic integration
(no significant change from columns 1 to 5 with the EU interaction terms). The
result in columns 6 and 7 however show that EU membership is correlated with
a statistically higher impact of regional output and more negative impact of world
output growth on domestic consumption growth, as compared to periods without EU
membership across countries in the sample (columns 2 and 3). Specifically, whereas a
1 percent increase in regional output growth for non-EU membership period correlates
with a .422 percent decline in idiosyncratic consumption growth, this results in a
.07 percent increase (.500-.422) in idiosyncratic consumption growth for periods of
EU membership. The positive (negative) overall coefficient may be considered to
reflect increased (decreased) business cycle synchronization. Taken alone, the period
after introduction of the Euro in 1999 produced similar results of increased regional
integration (or synchronization) for the members who adopted it. Finally, for the full
sample, focusing on EU countries who also adopted the Euro, regional risk sharing
was even higher — a 1 percent increase in regional output growth correlated with a
.142 percent increase (.455-.313) in idiosyncratic consumption growth.
[Table 1.6 about here]
Before EU integration (membership), regional risk sharing is negative. Output growth
in representative regional group may initially draw world capital inflow into the Euro-
pean region away from specific countries in favor of the economically stronger regional
representative group. Thus when regional output grows, consumption growth of many
specific countries could decline. This would then lead to the observed negative corre-
lation in column 2. As countries integrate into the region (through EU/EZ member-
ship), the observed correlation is positive because most countries may now share in
the benefits of regional output growth – growth in country-specific consumption.
Among the 28 EU countries, similar overall results pointing to higher regional
and lower world risk sharing after joining the EU are obtained. In the periods before
EU membership a 1% increase in regional output growth correlated with a .251%
decrease in consumption growth whereas the periods after EU membership correlate
with a .08% (.330-.251) increase in same. An insight that emerges from these results
is that growing regional integration in Europe is associated with further decline in
risk sharing potential with the world.
These findings are important contributions to the consumption risk sharing liter-
ature. The paper brings out a “competition" story between an integrated Europe and
the rest of the world. The competition is such that growth in the European region
correlates with increased consumption smoothing, and growth in the world correlates
dis-smoothing. An integrated Europe may compete with the world for capital inflow
and trade. Increased capital inflow into the integrated Europe may be associated with
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decreased inflow into the world representative group and vice versa. As a consequence
output growth in the integrated Europe may lead to less growth in the world repre-
sentative group of countries and vice versa. Hence, as the integrated Europe (world)
grows, consumption grows (declines) among European countries, on average. Another
explanation for the observed correlations is a business cycles synchronization story.
Integrated European countries may be facing relatively symmetric output correla-
tions (Schiavo, 2008). As such output growth in the region is likely to be associated
with consumption growth. Conversely, when business cycles in the integrated Europe
becomes relatively less synchronous with the world, it is likely that world growth is
correlated with decline in domestic consumption growth for European countries.
Risk sharing with EU, EZ membership and structural breaks
In this section, I estimate Eq(8) in separate regressions, split by the identified
structural break dates throughout the sample period: 1960-2017. For instance the
first regression output in row 2 of Table 1.7 considers panel estimates between 1960-
1979 and how the structural break in 1972 changed the estimates between 1973-1979.
Similarly, with the regression output associated with the 1980 structural break, col-
umn (1)-(3) are estimate for the period 1973-1989 while columns (5)-(7) are estimates
for the period 1980-1992. Regional risk sharing was low across board in Europe
whereas risk sharing with the world increased for European Economic Community
(EEC) member countries after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system (in 1972).
The higher risk sharing with the world, for EEC member countries may reflect their
ability to more easily adjust to the ensuing floating exchange rates regime system to
be able to diversify away consumption risks. The structural break in 1980 resulting
in only an intercept decline in risk sharing but EC countries and non-members looked
similar — both shared no significant risk with the European region, and became more
asynchronous to the business cycles of the world. This is not a surprising result given
the European economic slump in the 1980s, manifested in the high unemployment
levels that were observed see (Fitoussi et al., 1986).
[Table 1.7 about here]
Regional risk sharing picked momentum with the break that seems to be closely
related to the Maastricht Treaty, which was signed in February 1992 and went to
effect in November 1993. EU member countries on average shared significantly higher
risk with the European region. A 1 percent increase in regional output growth lead
to a .147 percent increase in idiosyncratic consumption growth for EU members, an
indication of growing business cycle synchronization as the EU grew in economic
integration potentially via the Maastricht Treaty. With the structural break in 2003,
together with increased EU membership regional risk sharing seems to have become
diluted. A 1 percent increase in regional output growth correlated with about a .02
percent (.502-.482). As identified before the global financial crisis may have negatively
impacted risk sharing. Taken together, EU countries that also adopted the Euro
shared more regional risks and became more asynchronous with the world considering
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the 2003 structural break. This result is not unique as similar estimates are found if
we allow the break point to rather be the introduction of the Euro in 1999.
1.7 Robustness Checks
The novel model introduced in the paper is checked for robustness to verify some
baseline results through the approaches described in this section. Firstly, the data
is further de-trended using a new approach introduced by Hamilton (2017) (allowing
for the possibility of some type of non-stationarity still existing in the series used for
estimation thus far). Hamilton proposes a regression of the series at date t on the four
most recent values as of date t− h to achieve all the intents and purposes of the HP
filter. The basis for this approach is that the HP filter intends to produce a stationary
component from an I(4) series but it has been long identified that the approximation
in the middle could vastly differ from the approximations are the beginning and end.
Hamilton’s alternative approach identifies that the main error in forecasting a series
more than h=8 quarters ahead is the inability to capture cyclical dynamics. Hence
as long as the series is I(4), a great approximate model of the cyclical pattern is the
residual (vt+h below) obtained from a model of a non-stationary y series of the from:
yt+h = β1yt + β2yt−1 + β3yt−2 + β4yt−3 + vt+h (1.9)
where h=8 quarters ahead for quarterly data or h=2 years ahead for annual data. The
residual obtained from this regression is the detrended series. After de-trending all
time-series, the results of replicating portions of Table 1.6 are shown in Table 1.8. The
results do not alter substantially. Non-EU countries are estimated to be more asyn-
chronous with regional business cycles and have no significant consumption smoothing
with the world (whereas there was consumption dis-smoothing with the world in Ta-
ble 1.6). There are slightly lower levels of consumption smoothing for EU countries
who adopted the Euro but signs and significance of coefficients remain the same.
[Table 1.8 about here]
As additional robustness checks, the European region is represented by the 28 EU
countries and also by all 45 European countries in the sample. Apart from slight
changes to the magnitudes of the coefficients in Table 1.6, the signs and significance
are unchanged with the results shown in Table 1.8. Finally I estimate the model used
in Kose et al. (2009) and Rangvid et al. (2016) in which only idiosyncratic consump-
tion growth is regressed on idiosyncratic output growth. The estimated coefficients
shown in column 1 are almost identical to those that have been estimated with the
model proposed in this paper. Thus this paper provides a novel way of extending
the existing literature to analyze more dynamics in one framework. Specifically the
existing literature tend to be agnostic about the rest-of-word, whereas by splitting
the ROW into a European representative group and a world representative group, the
paper is able to show that regional group may have a positive effect on consumption
growth whereas the world group may have a negative effect. While Schiavo (2008)
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identifies that European integration could lead to synchronised business cycles, I ex-
tend the idea by finding that European integration is also associated with higher
levels of consumption risk sharing.
1.8 Conclusion
The prevailing view in the area of international risk sharing is that the extent of
risk sharing is much less than theory might predict. Thus while globalization has
noticeably surged, countries have not diversified away consumption risks correspond-
ingly. The existing discussion often quantifies how much risk has been shared with
the world at large, outside specific countries. The main contribution of this paper is
to model the “world at large" (from the European countries’ perspective) as consist-
ing of a core European region and a world representative group. This decomposition
produces several unique findings that help to analyze consumption risk sharing in the
face of growing regional economic integration in Europe.
The paper analyses the evolution of consumption risk sharing within Europe, with
emphasis on how belonging the European union and additionally the Eurozone could
improve ability of countries to diversify away consumption risks. I find that, taken
together, the periods in which countries joined the EU and/or adopted the Euro
are associated with higher levels of consumption risk sharing. Of the EU expansion
efforts, the empirical evidence also points to the likelihood of the Maastricht treaty
being an important catalyst for high risk sharing within the European region. It
is possible that a country that is integrated into the "region" is able to accumulate
more from cross asset ownership to increase consumption, whereas at the same time,
non-participants in the region experience less inward FDI and asset inflow, leading
to slower growth in their consumption.
Another key finding is that of a possible “competition effect" between a more in-
tegrated Europe and the major countries of the rest-of-world. An integrated Europe
competes with the world for capital inflow and trade. Increased capital inflow into the
integrated Europe may be associated with decreased inflow into the world representa-
tive group and vice versa. As a consequence output growth in the integrated Europe
may lead to less growth in the world representative group of countries and vice versa.
Hence, as the integrated Europe (world) grows, consumption grows (declines) among
European countries, on average.
14
Figure 1.1: Correlation between idiosyncratic consumption and regional output
growth: 1
Note: Correlation maps are drawn for 34 countries that shapefiles could be extracted for from the
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) maps database. Countries whose
shapefiles could not be extracted have white spots. Water bodies are also white spots.
Figure 1.2: Correlation between idiosyncratic consumption and regional output
growth: 2
Note: Correlation maps are drawn for 34 countries that shapefiles could be extracted for from the
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) maps database. Countries whose
shapefiles could not be extracted have white spots. Water bodies are also white spots.
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Table 1.1: Data availability and structural break dates by country
The Bai-Perron test could not be performed for samples beginning in 1990. In such cases I impose
the break in 2003 that was observed for similar countries. The first 11 countries started using the
Euro in 1999. ∗ Lithuania joined the EU in 2004. The United Kingdom exited the EU in 2017.













Cyprus (2008) 1960 no break
Estonia (2011) 1990 no test
Greece(2002) 1960 1972,1981,1988
Latvia (2014) 1990 no test
Lithuania(2015)∗ 1990 no test
Malta (2008) 1960 2002
Slovakia (2009) 1990 no test
Slovenia (2007) 1990 no test
non-EZ EU countries
Bulgaria(2007) 1970 no break
Croatia(2013) 1990 no test
Czech Rep.(2004) 1990 no test
Denmark(1973) 1960 1982,1994,2005
Hungary(2004) 1970 no break
Poland(2004) 1970 no break
Romania(2007) 1960 no break
Sweden(1995) 1960 1983
United Kingdom (1973)∗ 1960 1970,1978,2006
non-EZ non-EU countries
Albania 1990 no test
Armenia 1990 no test
Azerbaijan 1990 no test
Belarus 1990 no test
Bosnia & Herz. 1990 no test
Georgia 1990 no test
Iceland 1960 1970
Kazakhstan 1990 no test
Norway 1960 1970,1978,1986
Moldova 1990 not test
Russia 1990 not test
Serbia 1990 no test
Switzerland 1960 1992,2003
Macedonia 1990 no test
Turkey 1960 no break
Ukraine 1990 no test
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
1. This table presents summary statistics for the major sub-groupings used in the paper.
2. Per capital real GDP and consumption are in US dollars and population is in millions.
consumptiong & outputg are the growth rates in per capita real consumption and real GDP
EU 15 1960-1998 EU 15 1999-2017
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
consumption 585 13,324 4,833 285 28,439 5,771
output 585 19,025 8,054 285 41,581 14,457
population 585 23.48 24.55 285 26.20 26.62
consumptiong 570 .032 .028 285 .028 .047
outputg 570 .033 .035 285 .026 .046
EU 13 1960-1998 EU 13 1999-2017
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
consumption 267 7,387 3,651 247 17,249 5,100
output 267 10,000 5,099 247 22,409 7,547
population 267 10.36 11.57 247 8.22 10.28
consumptiong 254 .030 .075 247 .042 .044
outputg 254 .028 .079 247 .045 .049
non-EU 28 1960-1998 non-EU 1999-2017
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
consumption 293 9,764 6,827 323 13,326 10,048
output 293 14,041 10,923 323 17,752 16,697
population 293 15.47 28.43 323 19.83 36
consumptiong 276 0 .119 323 .049 .073
outputg 276 -.007 .132 323 .055 .078
All 45 pre-Euro All 45 post-Euro
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
consumption 1,145 11,029 5,755 855 19,497 9,959
output 1,145 15,645 9,141 855 27,041 17,333
population 1,145 18.37 23.99 855 18.60 28.38
consumptiong 1,100 .024 .073 855 .040 .058
outputg 1,100 .022 .082 855 .042 .062
World 15 pre-Euro World 15 post-Euro
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Obs Mean Std. Dev.
consumption 555 10,751 10,449 285 20,379 13,782
output 555 10,801 35,522 285 31,630 22,712
population 555 165.35 287.71 285 236.30 411.36
consumptiong 540 .028 .059 285 .034 .063
outputg 540 .028 .073 285 .036 .067
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Table 1.3: Regional group GDP weights. The table shows average GDP weights
over the specified subsamples.
country 1960− 1979 1980− 1999 2000− 2017 Full sample
Austria 2.15 2.19 2.38 2.24
Belgium 3.19 3.06 2.91 3.06
Denmark 1.90 1.76 1.55 1.74
Finland 1.37 1.36 1.38 1.37
France 17.50 17.13 15.97 16.90
Germany 23.82 23.43 22.16 23.17
Greece 1.75 1.88 2.13 1.84
Ireland 0.60 0.68 1.41 0.88
Italy 13.38 14.81 14.15 14.11
Luxembourg 0.17 0.18 0.29 0.21
Netherlands 4.67 4.64 5.06 4.78
Portugal 1.36 1.48 1.85 1.55
Spain 7.41 7.62 9.98 8.28
Sweden 3.13 2.89 2.65 2.90
United Kingdom 17.60 16.87 16.13 16.55
GDP weights are calculated as the GDP of each country divided by the total GDP of the regional
group over time. Thus the weights are updated from year to year.
Table 1.4: World group GDP weights. The table shows average GDP weights over
the specified subsamples.
country 1960− 1979 1980− 1999 2000− 2017 Full sample
Australia 2.39 2.28 1.97 2.18
Brazil 3.57 4.14 5.04 4.42
Canada 4.15 4.01 3.08 3.72
China 10.18 11.98 23.57 15.58
Hong Kong 0.31 0.48 0.69 0.54
India 7.04 6.23 9.79 7.34
Japan 12.24 13.45 9.87 12.34
Mexico 4.20 4.33 3.70 4.14
Republic of Korea 0.79 1.56 3.15 2.05
Saudi Arabia 3.90 2.48 2.12 2.34
Singapore 0.12 0.21 0.64 0.34
South Africa 1.74 1.62 1.27 1.52
United Arab Emirates 0.87 0.89 1.02 0.94
United States 50.72 46.88 33.40 42.70
Viet Nam 0.33 0.39 0.68 0.50
GDP weights are calculated as the GDP of each country divided by the total GDP of the world
group over time. Thus the weights are updated from year to year.
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Table 1.5: Country grouping and corresponding list
country subsets country list
European Union (EU) 6 Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
Netherlands
EU 9 (1973) EU 6,Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom
EU 15 (1995) EU 9, Austria, Finland, Greece, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden
EU 28 (2013) EU 15, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Rep.,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia
Core Eurozone (EZ) Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands
Periphery EZ Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Late-Comer EZ Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia,
Slovenia
Non-EZ EU OECD Czech Rep., Denmark, Hungary, Poland, Sweden,
United Kingdom
Non-EZ EU non-OECD Bulgaria,Croatia, Romania
Non-EU OECD Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey
Non-EU non-OECD Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia &
Herz., Georgia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Russia, Serbia,
Macedonia, Ukraine
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Figure 1.3: 10-year rolling panel regressions: time-variation in consumption
risk-sharing
Note: Coefficients depict dependence on own country output growth, risk sharing with the region,
and risk sharing with the world respectively. Panel B represents all EU countries that were not
members of the EU prior to 1995.
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Table 1.6: Baseline Regression: European Union and Eurozone membership and risk
sharing
The estimated equation in each regression is
∆ci,t−∆ct = α+ β∆yi,t + δ∆yr,t + γ∆yw,t +Dk + φ1(∆yi,t ×Dk) + φ2(∆yr,t ×Dk.) + φ3(∆yw,t ×Dk) + εi,t.
riskc is the level of dependence on own output growth while riskr and riskw are levels of risk sharing within
Europe and world respectively.








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Full sample
k : EU dummy .760∗∗∗ -.422∗∗∗ -.430∗∗∗ -.003 -.124 .500∗∗∗ -.207∗∗∗ .679
[18.10] [-4.45] [-8.19] [-1.07] [-0.18] [3.29] [-3.24] (1955)
k : EU × EZ dummy .754∗∗∗ -.313∗∗∗ -.468∗∗∗ .004 -.075 .455∗∗∗ -.420∗∗∗ .676
[18.76] [-4.49] [-11.61] [1.37] [-0.80] [3.00] [-4.14] (1955)
k : EU × EZ dummy∗ .791∗∗∗ -.400∗∗∗ -.568∗∗∗ -.002 -.069 .474∗∗∗ -.250∗∗ .709
[18.68] [-4.09] [-7.12] [-0.36] [-0.72] [2.84] [-1.91] (1215)
EU 28 subsample
k : EU dummy .728∗∗∗ -.251∗∗∗ -.390∗∗∗ .000 -.091 .330∗∗∗ -.247∗∗∗ .619
[12.32] [-3.82] [-4.93] [0.08] [-0.80] [2.48] [-3.00] (1356)
k : EU × EZ dummy .701∗∗∗ -.128∗∗ -.471∗∗∗ .007∗∗∗ -.022 .270∗∗ -.416∗∗∗ .617
[12.49] [-2.28] [-9.59] [2.59] [-0.22] [2.02] [-3.99] (1356)
k : EU × EZ dummy∗ .819∗∗∗ -.145∗∗ -.531∗∗∗ .008∗ -.147 .295∗∗ -.341∗∗ .676
[23.40] [-2.40] [-4.87] [1.69] [-1.58] [2.11] [-2.46] (756)
1. z-statistics are shown in square brackets and ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01 are
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Standard errors are clustered by i.d. Sample size is
shown in parenthesis.
2. The regressions with (*) drop pre-1990 data from estimation. This is due to pre-1990 data
missing for some EU 28 countries.
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Table 1.7: Regression analysis with structural breaks
The estimated equation in each regression is
∆ci,t−∆ct = α+ β∆yi,t + δ∆yr,t + γ∆yw,t +Dk + φ1(∆yi,t ×Dk) + φ2(∆yr,t ×Dk.) + φ3(∆yw,t ×Dk) + εi,t.
riskc is the level of dependence on own output growth while riskr and riskw are levels of risk sharing within
Europe and world respectively.








k : EU × break (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Break: 1972 .540∗∗∗ -.200∗∗∗ -.499∗∗∗ .003 -.330∗∗ .064 .365∗ .509
[11.02] [-2.85] [-7.43] [0.53] [-2.36] [0.30] [1.74] (480)
Break: 1980 .584∗∗∗ -.153 -.454∗∗∗ -.006∗∗∗ -.020 .042 .104 .660
[9.80] [-1.64] [-3.84] [-3.35] [-0.34] [0.62] [1.29] (584)
Break: 1993 .786∗∗∗ -.299∗∗∗ -.237∗∗∗ .012∗∗∗ -.181 .446∗∗∗ -.548∗∗∗ .725
[17.35] [-4.76] [-2.84] [3.63] [-1.43] [3.27] [-4.83] (845)
Break: 2003 .825∗∗∗ -.482∗∗∗ -.705∗∗∗ -.010∗ -.065 .504∗∗∗ -.074 .701
[12.83] [-4.30] [-7.28] [-1.66] [-0.79] [3.52] [-0.59] (1125)
k : EU × break × EZ
Break: 2003 .825∗∗∗ -.390∗∗∗ -.651∗∗∗ -.001 -.150 .555∗∗∗ -.275∗∗ .699
[13.53] [-4.08] [-8.90] [-0.32] [-1.47] [3.34] [-2.17] (1125)
k : EU × break × EZ
Break: 1999 .828∗∗∗ -.390∗∗∗ -.656∗∗∗ -.002 -.148 .532∗∗∗ -.231∗∗ .698
[13.48] [-4.04] [-8.74] [-0.51] [-1.40] [3.20] [-1.95] (1125)
1. z-statistics are shown in square brackets and ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard
errors are clustered by i.d. Sample size is shown in parenthesis.
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Table 1.8: Robustness checks: various specifications
The estimated equation in each regression is
∆ci,t−∆ct = α+ β∆yi,t + δ∆yr,t + γ∆yw,t +Dk + φ1(∆yi,t ×Dk) + φ2(∆yr,t ×Dk.) + φ3(∆yw,t ×Dk) + εi,t.
riskc is the level of dependence on own output growth while riskr and riskw are levels of risk sharing within
Europe and world respectively.








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Using Hamilton’s approach
k : EU dummy .753∗∗∗ -.810∗∗∗ .098 -.013∗∗∗ .004 .783∗∗∗ -.633∗∗∗ .453
[7.71] [-4.42] [0.65] [-3.96] [0.04] [3.71] [-3.46] (1016)
k : EU × EZ dummy .730∗∗∗ -.778∗∗∗ .054 -.014∗∗∗ .094 .680∗∗∗ -.656∗∗∗ .452
[8.43] [-4.18] [0.34] [-4.60] [1.35] [3.19] [-3.73] (1016)
Using EU 28 as regional representative group
k : EU dummy .794∗∗∗ -.526∗∗∗ -.451∗∗∗ -.003 -.064 .593∗∗∗ -.344∗∗∗ .711
[17.65] [-4.08] [-4.39] [-0.57] [-0.87] [3.64] [-2.93] (1215)
k : EU × EZ dummy .796∗∗∗ -.368∗∗∗ -.526∗∗∗ .002 -.133 .551 -.393∗∗∗ .708
[18.49] [-3.79] [-6.79] [0.44] [-1.37] [3.26] [-3.18] (1215)
Using 45 European countries to represent region
k : EU dummy .803∗∗∗ -.332∗∗∗ -.419∗∗∗ .007∗ -.090 .432∗∗∗ -.455∗∗∗ .707
[17.63] [-3.43] [-3.75] [1.72] [-1.29] [3.73] [-3.50] (1215)
k : EU × EZ dummy .798∗∗∗ -.223∗∗∗ -.508∗∗∗ .011∗∗∗ -.180∗ .482∗∗∗ -.619∗∗∗ .705
[18.14] [-3.02] [-5.65] [2.85] [-1.99] [3.82] [-4.05] (1215)
Estimation using idiosyncratic consumption and output
k : EU dummy .754∗∗∗ -.000 -.082 .667
[17.88] [-0.06] [-0.96] (1955)
k : EU × EZ dummy .745∗∗∗ -.001 -.010 .667
[18.53] [-0.71] [0.09] (1955)
1. z-statistics are shown in square brackets and ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Standard
errors are clustered by i.d. Sample size is shown in parenthesis.
2. To find the immediate impact of the Euro, data prior to 1990 is dropped. Also to do
corresponding analysis for countries with data only beginning in 1990, dropping pre-1990 data is
useful.
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Chapter 2: Economic Integration in Europe: Measurement and Implica-
tion on Risk sharing
2.1 Introduction
Europe has become increasingly integrated in the past half century. It started
as the six-member European Communities (EC) in 1957, then expanded to a nine-
member group in 1973 that was propelled by the collapse of the Bretton Woods
system (James, 2013), and ultimately became a 12-member European Union (EU) in
1993 (created through the Maastricht Treaty in 1992). The Maastricht Treaty lead
to the creation of the EU as a single market for goods, services, capital, and labor
since 1993, and the introduction of the Euro in 1999. The single-markets agreement
also extends to countries such as Norway, Iceland, and Switzerland which are non-EU
members. Ultimately, the Euro added the dimension of common fixed exchange rates
to the integration efforts.
Prior to the Euro, the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979 had EC currencies
pegged to the deutschmark. In 1993, currencies were then pegged to the European
Currency Unit (ECU). Over twenty years into these arrangements, this study seeks to
measure the extent of both financial and real integration in Europe, aiming to discover
the existence of a EU or Euro effect. Stated differently, the study seeks to find if “more
integration" through the EU and Eurozone has lead to similarity in selected financial
and real variables across countries. This assessment is crucial considering the fact
that major advanced European countries such as Sweden, Denmark and the United
Kingdom opted out of the Eurozone arrangements, with the UK currently evaluating
the suitability of remaining in the EU.
The approach taken in the study is to split economic integration into its financial
and real components. Financial integration is multi-faceted but often refers to low
cross-country dispersion in return of securities (price-based measures) as well as sim-
ilarity in portfolio allocation behavior of economic agents across countries (quantity-
based). Real integration typically refers to similarity in production, trade and labor
markets flexibilities (Pisani-Ferry et al., 2006). Progress towards higher levels of fi-
nancial integration in the EU is evident from yearly reports of the European Central
Bank. For instance a 2018 annual report on Financial integration in Europe claims
that “...cross-country differences in equity returns declined to levels similar to pre-
crisis levels and to the dispersion between sectoral returns." Current targets aim to
achieve better integration in money and corporate bond markets through “...further
progress with the capital markets union and to complete the banking union." How-
ever real integration does not appear to be actively pursued and this has important
implications for welfare (consumption risk sharing in this study) and policy.
A common definition of consumption risk sharing is the situation whereby shocks
to a country’s consumption are diversified and shared with other countries (Rangvid
et al., 2016). In several empirical applications, when a country’s consumption growth
depends less on its own income growth and more on the income growth of the rest-
of-world (RoW), consumption risk sharing is considered to be high. Historically,
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consumption risk sharing has been considered a beneficial consequence of strong fi-
nancial integration because it allows agents to smoothen consumption through cross-
border asset ownership (Mundell, 1973; McKinnon and Kenen, 2002; Kose et al., 2009;
Rangvid et al., 2016). Despite high integration in global financial markets (Obstfeld,
1993; Lewis, 1996; Sørensen et al., 2007), ECB (2018)) consumption risk sharing is
found to be low in these studies, which creates a puzzle. I demonstrate in this study
that by analyzing money markets, bond markets, stock markets (for financial), and
industrial production and consumer prices (for real), divergent patterns of integration
emerge, which provides some explanations for the risk sharing puzzle.
Financial integration amidst uneven or low real integration can be destabilizing.
Firstly, the introduction of the euro (leading to a sudden drop in money and bonds
rates) represented a shock to wealth and demand in countries noted to have high risk
premia. The resulting reduction in public debt burden led to uneven appreciation in
real exchange rates and, subsequently, a widening of current account deficits (Pisani-
Ferry et al., 2006) particularly in “periphery" countries1. The second problem relates
to the “Walters critique". Inflation in a country belonging to a currency union leads
to a decline in real interest rates that further stimulates domestic demand. Since
inflationary pressures are asymmetric in nature across union member countries, it
could further lead to divergence in real economic activity (Lane, 2006).
If product markets are highly integrated, the resulting appreciation in real ex-
change rates could counterbalance the excess domestic demand by a shrinkage in
exports. On the other hand, if product markets are not integrated, excess domestic
demand could lead to boom and bust cycles that might require foreign borrowing to
achieve stability. At best, a long run convergence in price levels could occur as the
high inflation countries experience higher labor and other production costs leading to
less competitiveness vis-a-vis the lower inflationary currency union members.
Another source of destabilization is the fact that European monetary unification
permits a common external exchange rate for all members with non-union member
countries. Upon the introduction of the euro, and with the ECB suddenly cutting
interest rates, potential portfolio returns declined (albeit to various levels depending
on the initial levels of nominal interest rates) resulting in a decline in the external
value of the euro against major RoW currencies. In addition to a surge in domestic
demand, Lane (2006) finds unsustainable levels of wages among some countries as
a consequence. Having lost the use of nominal depreciation in national currency
to correct the over-valuation in labor markets, an adjustment problem necessarily
occurs. These observations, however, do not discount the stabilizing nature of a
common currency and the efforts of the ECB in achieving some level of monetary
stability. Nonetheless, the external value of the euro can expose euro area members
1The idea of “core" and "periphery" countries within the then European Community was intro-
duced by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992). Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain have been
historically considered "periphery" within the EMU (Lane, 2006) and (Skaperdas, 2011). Skaperdas,
for instance, considers Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Netherlands
as the Eurozone “core".
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to asymmetric domestic shocks in real sectors.
From a policy perspective, there is a sense in which financial and real integra-
tion need to be considered together. Pisani-Ferry et al. (2006) suggests that policy
considers carefully if financial and real integration are complements, substitutes, or if
financial integration is an accelerator of real integration. If as complements, policy
should aim at improving real sectors to catch up with the pace of financial integra-
tion. As substitutes, a slow development of real integration should be completely
ignored since achieving financial integration by itself would be an end in itself. If
real sectors are expected to catch up automatically, then financial integration should
be the main focus (accelerator). In this study I consider them as complements, in
the sense that advances in the real sector would bolster financial integration by min-
imizing the likelihood of asymmetric shocks and structural imbalances, creating the
enabling environment for cross-border risk polling. To my knowledge, this is the first
study that uses an estimation technique capable of comparing both financial and real
integration and their implications for consumption risk sharing in one framework.
It is not often emphasized in previous literature that financial globalization has
both regional and RoW components that need to be taken into consideration to
avoid biases in identification of effects2. Regional integration comes with other ar-
rangements such as cross-border labor mobility, fiscal federalism and central monetary
policy arrangements. This paper contributes to the literature by proposing a model
that identifies regional and global effects. It also contributes to the recent string of
studies that aim to fix the puzzle of low consumption risk sharing in the presence of
high regional and global financial integration.
Much of previous studies consider only one measure of economic integration –
integration with the rest of the world (or global integration)3. This may be an outcome
of conventional two-country models and postulating economic integration as a move
from autarky to exchange. This is interesting given that most policy initiatives to
promote economic integration are regional (including bilateral) such as the European
Union, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and CFA-Franc zones in
Africa. Since a primary objective of economic integration is to bolster the regional
component (inter alia the world component), it is important to consider the extent
of regional integration and, if possible, to consider both regional and global economic
integration. For this purpose, I consider a model in which an economic entity – for
instance, the stock price – is impacted by global, regional, and country-specific (or
domestic) shocks.
Specifically, following Chow and Kim (2003) directly, Blanchard and Quah (1988)
indirectly and using monthly data from January 1960 to December 2018, I estimate a
vector autoregressive (VAR) model and use the forecast error variance decomposition
to measure both financial and real integration at the regional and global levels. This
2Bekaert and Mehl (2019) is the most recent study in the financial integration literature that
identifies regional and global effects separately in a factor model that measures the degree of financial
integration among 17 countries.
3Bekaert and Mehl (2019) is a notable exception.
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measure is derived from a well-known methodology that uses the extent to which
countries are influenced by similar shocks as a measure of the integration between
them. Using this approach, integration could be measured across all financial and
real variables separately, and at both the regional and global levels.
To measure the degree of financial integration, the dispersion of cross-border prices
of securities (price-based) or the quantity of cross-border securities held (quantity-
based) are two typical approaches found in the literature. Hoffmann et al. (2019)
recently developed regional composite price and quantity-based measures that aggre-
gates across money, bond, equity and banking markets. A similar measure for real
integration –whether price-based or quantity-based– is rare. In this study money,
bond, stock, and CPI measures are price-based while industrial production is quan-
tity based. By considering how European countries are integrated in regards to each
of these variables separately (but using the same estimation framework) – both re-
gionally and globally – clearer insights emerge.
Overall regional shocks are expected to be more important across the five variables,
for more economically integrated members. I find, however, that only in the case of
money do regional shocks have an influential role in the EMU period (since Jan 1999)
for Eurozone countries. Regional shocks accounted for about 37% pre-EMU and 74%
post-EMU respectively, for the original EMU members. In the bond market, we find a
general switch from regional to country-specific shock importance in the EMU period,
even though regional shocks were dominant prior to the global financial crisis in 2007-
2009. With regards to industrial production the highest levels of regional integration
are found among Germany, Austria, Slovenia, Slovakia, United Kingdom, Hungary
and Poland, with about 48% importance of regional shock between them in the EMU
period. While an EU effect could be observed, no euro effect could be identified.
Additionally, while global shocks dominate stock markets across Europe, domestic
shocks dominate consumer prices on average. Another key finding is that Advanced
EU countries do not differ from Advanced non-EU countries in terms of how they
are affected by regional and global shocks, except for money markets. Risk sharing
therefore would not be expected to be as high as theory would predict, confirming
the findings from previous studies but providing a more insightful explanation as to
why.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Related literature is discussed in
section 2.2; methodology for estimation in section 2.3; data description in section 2.4;
results in section 2.5; and concluding remarks in section 2.6.
2.2 Related Literature
The impact of economic integration is often analyzed in the context of Optimum
Currency Areas (OCA) criteria. The OCA theory, inspired by Mundell (1961), stipu-
lates that the benefits of a common currency is worthwhile for countries that tend to
experience a sufficient degree of symmetric shocks and likely have synchronized busi-
ness cycles. In other words countries that experience asymmetric shocks to output do
not need to give up their independent monetary policy and ability to use exchange
rate adjustments to resolve economic imbalances, in favor of having a stable common
27
currency. This line of thought dominated research that sought to project if the Eu-
rozone and any new members that join the zone later would form an OCA. While
the OCA criteria emphasize the cost of joining a currency area, another strand of
research, inspired by Mundell’s later ideas (Mundell, 1973) focus on the “benefits"
of joining a currency area even if a country exhibits asynchronous cycles. One of
the main benefits is the degree of risk sharing that could be possible by joining a
more financially integrated market that allows for consumption smoothing through
cross-ownership of financial assets. In principle, the emphasis of the later idea is one
the centrality of financial markets, not labor markets (McKinnon, 2004) and also on
the endogeneity of optimum currency areas(Frankel and Rose, 1998).
In theory, complete (financial markets) would allow a consumer to invest in Arrow-
Debreu securities that yield state-independent returns that would be used to smooth
consumption. This insurance is termed consumption risk sharing. Thus capital mar-
ket developments outside a country has a tendency to reduce the link between Home
consumption and Home output if Home countries participate in global financial mar-
kets (see also Kose et al. (2009) and Rangvid et al. (2016)).
As with the progress of the European Union, among other things, removal of
barriers to trade, capital and labor mobility tend to precede adoption of a common
currency. Risk sharing potential is thus not limited to currency areas. European
common markets has improved trade, especially within the EMU. Rose (2000) for
instance finds a “home bias" where currency area countries trade about three times
among themselves than with those having different currencies. Obstfeld (1993); Imbs
(2004); Rangvid et al. (2016) and others have identified that integration reduces
transactions costs and improve trade and financial market activity and business cy-
cles synchronization (see also Frankel and Rose (1998); Schiavo (2008)). EU could
also share risks without necessarily being members of the Euro area through the Eu-
ropean common markets. For instance after controlling for the gradual trend in trade
intensity among EMU members, Berger and Nitsch (2008) find that the introduction
of the Euro by itself does not correlate with greater trade intensity. However the
potential effects of openness could go either way. If increased trade is inter-industry,
this could lead to more specialization and result in less synchronous business cycles
and industrial structures. The former argument presumes that the trade surge is
intra-industry. Thus in principle, the impact of economic integration (financial and
trade altogether) on risk diversification is inconclusive.
Also, insulation against domestic shocks with openness would imply more con-
sumption smoothing, while openness could also expose a country to foreign shocks
and hence less consumption smoothing (Lane, 2006; Christev and Melitz, 2013). Imag-
ine the extent to which European countries with slow productivity growth might be
exposed to import penetration by Asian textiles and electronics producers. Net de-
cline in incomes would be expected. Not only that, varying exposure to global shocks
could cause more divergence in economic fundamentals such as inflation differentials
of integrated countries.
The costs and benefits of economic integration are situated in the heart of the
trilemma concept – that a country has a choice of two among the following three
choices: independent monetary policy, capital market liberalization, and a fixed ex-
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change rate. Countries that join a currency area automatically give up the ability
to run independent monetary polices but rather choose a fixed exchange rate, leav-
ing only the choice of adjusting the degree of capital account openness. Even for
countries that are not integrated, Passari and Rey (2015), Obstfeld (2015) and other
recent research argue that the trilemma may have morphed into a dilemma identify-
ing that the US-driven global financial cycles in liquidity and credit reduce the ability
of non-US central banks to realistically adjust domestic long-term interest rates (see
also Bekaert and Mehl (2019)).
Risk sharing has been empirically analyzed in various facets. Asdrubali et al.
(1996) identifies the channels and extent of risk-sharing among US states, defined
as the extent of consumption smoothing that are attained through either capital
markets, credit markets or the federal government spending between 1963-90. A
primary finding from that study is that risk sharing through financial markets are
about twice that of risk sharing through US government budget disbursements. The
work by Sørensen and Yosha (1998) extends the consumption smoothing channels
in Asdrubali et al. (1996) to the European Community (EC) countries and OECD
countries over the period 1966-90. There are however major differences between the
US and EU cases. Private capital market redistributes 48% of asymmetric output
shocks at the state level whereas 15% is redistributed at the national level among EU
countries(Marinheiro, 2002). Also, despite financial markets contributing more to
risk sharing than government budgets in the US, federal budget redistributes about a
quarter of negative shocks to income of states, whereas there is no such inter-country
distribution in the Eurozone.
However, with the identified inter-country levels of risk sharing in these and other
studies (such as Rangvid et al. (2016)) being low, Christev and Melitz (2013) casts
doubts on the role of cross-country holdings of property claims on risk sharing alto-
gether, finding that risk sharing in the EU rather comes through the encouragement
of price competition, contestable home markets, ability to buy insurance at home,
and harmonization of regulations. In doing so, the indirect (usual approach) of de-
termining risk sharing — how less relative consumption growth is correlated with
related output growth — is questioned, and replaced with a more direct method that
uses the impact of economic integration on consumption volatility.
The idea of separating regional from global financial integration is not new.
Bekaert and Mehl (2019) propose a factor model of equity returns to measure finan-
cial integration, in which regional and global factors are distinguished and separately
measured. This approach is builds on Rangvid et al. (2016) who measure financial
integration as a low degree of equity return dispersion across markets. While I use
a different measure of financial integration, separating regional and world impacts
helps better when analyzing European countries who are integrated both regionally
and globally, to varying degrees.
2.3 Methodology for Estimation
The approach taken is adapted from the optimum currency areas (OCA) litera-
ture. An influential study by Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1992) for instance study the
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correlation of aggregate supply shocks as a measure of how similar integrated coun-
tries are in terms of macroeconomic structure. In such studies, among other models
that seek to separate aggregate demand and supply disturbances, Blanchard and
Quah (1988) shock decomposition is employed. The required underlying assumption
is that while aggregate supply shocks transcend the exchange rate regime adopted
by a country, aggregate demand shocks tend to be regime-specific. The Blanchard
and Quah (1988) technique can as well be used to separate more shocks to domestic
macroeconomic variables. For instance Chow and Kim (2003) use it to decompose
shocks to global output into “global", “regional" or “country-specific" (ug, ur, and ud
respectively).
Global shocks affect all economies both inside and outside the regional boundary.
The financial crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2009, and the two oil price in-
creases of the 1970s may be considered global shocks. Regional shocks are restricted to
impact only economies within the region. German unification of 1989 and the result-
ing fiscal expansion, as well as the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European
Union may constitute regional shocks for European countries. Country-specific shocks
could be related to either aggregate demand or aggregate supply impacts on fiscal
policies or trade patterns. In these models, the impact of the three shocks are sepa-
rated on the basis of the assumption that each country is small in the region, and the
region is small in the world. Thus regional shocks are expected to matter in a small
open economy whose economic structures are similar to its trading partners in the
region. Also global shocks are expected to affect all countries in the same direction.
[Table 2.1 about here]
Let yd denote the domestic variable of interest (interest rate, stock index, industrial
production index, CPI). yd is subject to ug, ur, and ud such that:
yd = β0 + β1(L)ugt + β2(L)urt + β3(L)udt (2.1)
if the domestic variable is stationary; and
∆yd = β0 + β1(L)ugt + β2(L)urt + β3(L)udt (2.2)
if the domestic variable is integrated of order one (I(1)). Stationarity test results are
reported in Table 2.2. In each equation, β(L) = βi1L + βi2L2 + ... is a polynomial
function of the lag operator, L. The goal is to recover the structural shocks, ug, ur,
and ud. With growing European regional integration, the regional shock component
is expected to be more important.
To this end we employ the Blanchard and Quah (1988) method of decomposi-
tion that relies on separating shocks into its transitory and permanent components.
Following this structure and its implementation in Chow and Kim (2003), we take
global, regional and domestic indices/variables - yg, yr, and yd - to be affected by
the global, regional and domestic shocks, denoted by ug, ur, and ud respectively. The

















where Aij(L) = a0ij + a1ij(L) + a2ij(L)2 + a3ij(L)3 + ... are polynomials of the lag
operator L such that individual coefficients of Aij(L) are impulse responses denoted
by aij(k). For instance A11(L) represents impulse responses of global shocks on ∆ygt .
Based on the stationarity tests, all global and regional variables are non-stationary,
and hence are entered in first-differences above. While the domestic variable are also
entered in first-differences, they are replaced by their levels in cases where they are
stationary.
[Table 2.2 about here]
Following the Blanchard-Quah (1989) decomposition method to identify the struc-
tural shocks, the following 3 restrictions on the VAR system is required for iden-
tification: (1) Regional shocks have no long-run effects on the global index; (2)
Country-specific shocks have no long-run effects on the global index; (3) Country-
specific shocks have no long-run effects on the regional index. These conditions imply













All structural shocks are assumed to have unit variance and are uncorrelated.
These restrictions are assumed to apply only for the long-run responses but not
for short-run responses. Besides, transitory global shocks (no long-run effects on
global indices) could be classified as regional or local, and transitory regional shocks
classified as local. Finally, note that these assumptions work under the generalizations
of the small-economy and small region assumptions in international economics.






















where Cij(L) = c0ij + c1ij(L) + c2ij(L)2 + c3ij(L)3 + ... are polynomials of the lag operator
L and eg, er, and ed are residuals from the VAR model. After estimating the VAR,
we obtain the moving average representation as before. The p−step ahead forecast
errors are composites of the pure innovations. Detailed demonstration of how the
pure shocks are recovered from the VAR residuals is well-known and hence not shown
here.
Introduction of the Euro and Identification
The introduction of the Euro in 1999 was a major policy move toward greater
integration, but it was the culmination of decades of different levels of integration.
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From a six-member European Communities (EC) in 1957, a nine-member expansion
in 1973 that was propelled by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system (James,
2013), to a 12-member European Union in 1993 (created through the Maastricht
Treaty in 1992), the Euro added the common fixed exchange rate dimension to the
integration efforts. Even prior to the Euro, the Exchange Rate Mechanism in 1979
had EC currencies pegged to the deutschmark, with currencies being pegged to the
European Currency Unit (ECU) from 1993. Due to this, it is hard to identify a Euro
effect. The study uses the introduction of the Euro for its significant role in the EMU
and how its potential impacts on financial markets can be more easily used to make
inference about risk sharing, not to identify an Euro effect.
2.4 Data Description
The sources of data and summary statistics are on Table 2.4. Stock market and
industrial production indexes are obtained from Main Economic Indicators (MEI),
OECD. Money market and bond market rates are compiled from both IMF’s Inter-
national Financial Statistics and MEI. Stock markets had a smooth positive trend
until the volatile period beginning in the early 2000s (see Figure 2.1). Periphery
Eurozone countries had the most volatile stock markets, but rebounded back to the
long-run trend, in line with other country groups (see Table 2.3 for a complete list of
country groups). This aside, the RoW group appear to share similar characteristics
with Advanced European countries as shown in similar mean, median, standard de-
viation, minima and maxima across industrial production, money and bond markets,
and consumer prices.
[Table 2.3 about here]
Periphery countries appear to have higher money and bond market rates on average
as compared to Advanced countries. For instance average money and bond rates
were 6.43% and 7.23% for Periphery countries while they were 5.58% and 5.81% re-
spectively. This observation is however characterized by the pre-euro era. Since the
inception of the Euro, the European Central Bank maintain the common policy rates,
leading to similar money market rates in the Eurozone. In line with theoretical ex-
pectations, consumer prices were historically higher among the highest productivity
countries (Advanced European and RoW countries), followed by Periphery EZ coun-
tries (see Figure 2.1). However over time, consumer prices among the Periphery and
Emerging European countries have significantly increased as their economies grow
and become more productive. Despite this, a possibility exist that these countries
may be experiencing marked inflation with minimal productivity gains.
[Table 2.4 about here]
[Figure 2.1 about here]
[Figures 2.2a and 2.2b about here]
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2.5 Results
In this section we provide detailed explanation for financial and real integration
separately. This is followed by implication of the findings for consumption risk shar-
ing. The 12-month ahead forecast error variance decomposition were obtained by first
estimating the VAR in section 3 and recovering the structural shocks.
Financial integration
For financial integration, we investigate the data for money markets (Table 2.5),
bond market (Table 2.6), and stock markets (Table 2.7).
[Tables 2.5 and 2.6 about here]
Among the core EZ countries, the role of regional shocks sharply increased in money
markets from 37% percent on average during the pre-EMU period to 74% in the EMU
period. In marked contrast, global shocks play almost no role. Among the periphery
EZ, the extent of money market integration seems varied and related to the length
of each country’s membership in the currency union. All economies involved in the
EA crisis (Greece, Ireland, Italy, and Spain) show levels of regional integration that
is as high as among the core EZ countries. Thus money market integration seems to
have been robust through the global financial crisis (2007-2009) and the Euro Area
(EA) crisis4 than before. It is also much higher than that in the newer members
such as Estonia and Lithuania, but Slovenia is a notable except (not just in the
money markets but across other variables shown later). Outside the EZ and outside
EU – with Croatia being a main exception – the money market seems to be driven
by country-specific shocks with regional shocks playing the distant second. Global
influence is as weak as in the EZ countries. These suggest that, after 20 years since
inception, the euro remains a regional currency compared to the US dollar and the
interest rate decisions of the European Central Bank reach mainly the EZ countries5.
Financial integration in the bond market shows several important differences. In
the pre-EMU, the bond market is influenced by both global and regional shocks in
most core EZ countries. With the introduction of the euro, regional shocks became
dominant pre-crisis but global shocks were more important post-crisis. The switch
from regional to global shock importance in the EMU period is similarly observed
for advanced countries both in the EU (but not EZ) and non-EU members (50%
for EU core; 55% for advanced EU; and about 57% for advanced non-EU). The EZ
periphery show diversity of the extent of financial integration. This is highlighted by
Greece which decently regionally integrated pre-EMU (38%), increasing to 47% prior
to the EA crisis, but a drastic drop to 3% taking the EA crisis into account. The
other EA crisis countries (Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) shows strong regional
4Begun in 2009 with Greece, and followed by Portugal, Italy, Ireland, and Spain experiencing
sovereign debt defaults. Portugal is excluded due to lack of necessary data for estimation.
5Norway and Switzerland exhibit remarkable regional markets integration at about 53% in the
EMU period
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integration even through the crisis period (averaging 45%). Of the new EZ members
only Slovenia has strong regional bond market integration. With the exception of
Poland, all other emerging European bond markets are influenced by country-specific
shocks.
[Table 2.7 about here]
Table 2.7 shows that stock markets across Europe are influenced mostly by global
shocks in the EMU period. There is a sharp increase in the role of global shocks in
all countries. This is no surprise due to the well-documented surge in global cross
financial assets ownership in the last couple decades. Only for Slovakia, Russia,
and Turkey are the global component less than 50%. This seems to suggest that
stock-market integration is related to the extent of financial market development
and the latter progresses in the global direction rather than regional. Thus a more
global rather than regional arrangement that regulates stock markets would be more
beneficial for European countries overall.
Real integration
For real integration we investigate industrial production (Table 2.8) and consumer
prices (Table 2.9). Industrial production results indicate that Germany, Austria, and
Finland in the EZ core are similarly affected highest by regional shocks, while France,
Belgium, and Netherlands are influenced by country-specific shocks. For instance the
average share of regional shocks to industrial production for the former Core EZ
members were 43% in the EMU period but only 7% for the latter EZ core. As far
as the OCA criteria goes, Germany, Austria, and Finland better fit the similarity
hypothesis pre-EMU whereas the latter group does not appear to.
[Tables 2.8 and 2.9 about here]
In the post-EMU period, the role of regional shocks is high for Italy, Estonia, Slovenia
and Slovakia in the EZ periphery. Among the original EZ members in the periphery,
regional shocks only accounted for 17% pre-EMU and 10% post-EMU. A case could
be made for new EZ members such as Slovenia, Slovakia, and Estonia satisfying the
OCA criteria after joining the Euro area. This is also consistent with the conventional
wisdom that the 12 original EZ members may not constitute an OCA in terms of
similarity of economic structures.
In the EMU period, new EZ members such as Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia
show evidence that regional integration has moved forward. They are influenced by
about 52% regional shocks. Among the Baltic 3 newcomer countries however, the role
of regional shocks is similar to or even lower than that during the pre-EMU period
for Latvia and Lithuania (with Estonia being an exception).
Outside the EMU, EU members are generally integrated in the European re-
gion. Advanced EU countries exhibit similar levels of shocks as Core EZ members.
Additionally, except for Bulgaria and Romania, emerging non-EZ countries such as
Hungary, Croatia, and Poland have reached the levels of regional integration as high
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as the EZ core in the pre-EMU, being influenced by 41% regional shocks on average
in the EMU period. Thus this type of regional integration occurred even without
joining the euro area. This suggests that they may be ready to join the EZ based on
the OCA criteria. The free trade, single-market arrangements and other EU harmo-
nizing policies may have also motivated this. All non-EU countries have industrial
production that is influenced mostly by country-specific shocks.
Consumer prices are influenced by country-specific shocks outside the EU (see Ta-
ble 2.9). In the EZ countries however, the regional component has increased usually
at the expense of country-specific shocks particularly among Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece and Portugal. The average share of the regional component of shocks
is about 50% among them. Price integration has not progressed much for other core
and original periphery members. The regional component of shocks is about 16%
among this group. While Estonia and Malta have a surge in the regional component
after EMU membership (35% from 0%), other new EZ members continue to primarily
influenced by country-specific shocks. Outside the EZ, regional shocks became more
important as a group only in the Advanced EU countries (similar to core EZ countries
like France, Germany, and Finland). Among emerging non-EU countries, there are
two key finding, neither in favor of regional shocks. Albania, Azerbaijan, Turkey,
and Ukraine have consumer prices that are influenced mainly by global shocks in the
EMU period (70%). Consumer prices in Russia and Serbia were influenced more by
country-specific shocks at the expense of global shocks.
Risk sharing implications
The bulk of evidence point to increased money and bond market integration in
Europe, except for Greece, countries that joined the EZ after 2004, and emerging
non-EU members. An interesting characteristic is that money market integration
is unique among Eurozone countries. Evidently this suggests that the ECB’s policy
rate has translated into a unified money market. However with bond markets primary
dictated by fiscal policy, Advanced European countries appear to have similar bond
markets, regardless of EZ or EU membership. Theory suggests that these similar
markets should enable economic agents to smooth consumption through cross-border
investments in money and bond markets.
Stock markets across Europe are dominated by global shocks. Thus economic
agents in Europe are more likely to smooth their consumption from cross-border
securities ownership with the RoW rather than with the European region. To this
end, moving from autarky (being influenced more by country-specific shocks) should
improve consumption smoothing whether it is with the RoW or the region. However
it poses a challenge for the EU and particularly EZ regional arrangements. This
is because if global shocks are more influential overall, then a more global rather
than the regional arrangement would be needed to regulate stock markets. Repeated
efforts by the ECB towards the capital markets union may need to proceed with care,
because it might not be in the best interest of most European countries.
Consumption risk sharing implications of real integration comes through differ-
ent channels. Given incomplete markets and under the empirical conditions of low
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trade elasticity and high shock persistence, Corsetti et al. (2008) have identified that
productivity shocks could have large persistent wealth effects across countries. The
central idea is that rigidities in technology shock transmission together with low labor
mobility would result in slow responses by agents to smooth consumption in econom-
ically integrated areas. This also implies that industrial production is likely to be
influenced more by domestic shocks under such conditions. However integrated coun-
tries are expected to be influenced more by regional shocks. Dominance of regional
shocks would suggest reduced barriers to transmission of production technology and
higher trade elasticities, permitting increased industrial production co-dependence
and wealth (and hence consumption) smoothing. Twenty years into the introduc-
tion of the Euro, industrial production is still divergent, minimizing the likelihood of
productivity shocks and wealth transmission.
In addition to shocks to industrial production, the study assessed if integrated
European countries are more or less influenced by regional shocks to consumer prices.
As pointed out earlier, reduction in inflation differentials has the potential for increas-
ing stability, allowing greater financial integration and consumption risk sharing. The
relative price convergence observed primarily among advanced countries in Europe
suggests that consumption risk sharing can be enhanced more agents across the coun-
tries. Among most other countries in Europe risk sharing potential is low due to lack
of price integration.
2.6 Concluding Remarks
The study measured financial and real integration Europe. The EU along with the
introduction of the Euro marked distinct avenues through which member countries
could smooth consumption risks. After having the European single markets, the Euro
followed soon afterwards because exchange rate risk remained a key barrier. As long
as national currencies existed, corporate bond holders for instance needed to price
into the value of their security holdings, not only pure corporate risk but also the
macroeconomic level risk of future changes in exchange rates. The United States and
Eurozone have completely removed this barrier through the use of common currencies.
However in the European case, De Grauwe (2018) demonstrates though that the
Euro alone was not enough – that strong centralized regulatory framework that consol-
idates national legal systems in accounting rules, corporate taxation, laws concerning
shareholders’ right among others, is required for the proper functioning of a currency
union. For instance whereas a federal deposit insurance system exists in the US to
give credibility to retail banks and support them in times of crisis, such is not existent
in the Eurozone. He also notes that sovereign debt crisis that hit Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, and Spain translated into loss of credibility among struggling banks and
shun them from the interbank market for loans to fund themselves. This is because
banks are the biggest holders of government debt. As the government loses credibility,
so do the banks. Thus an integrated regulatory system is required for full integration
across capital markets and retail markets (mortgage, consumer credit and insurance).
If these barriers are overcome, theory says, consumption risk sharing should increase.
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We find that Eurozone countries have high regional short and long term bond
market integration in the post-euro era. Except for newcomer EZ countries regional
shocks explain about 74% of short-term and about 40% of long-term rates in the
EMU period before the 2007-2009 financial and EA debt crisis for EZ countries. The
unique convergence in short-term rates among EZ countries in reasonable given that
the interest rate policy is set by the European Central Bank and short term rates
are closely related to the policy rate. Franks et al. (2018) argue that convergence in
long term interest rates in the Euro zone suggests that markets viewed credit risks
across EZ countries the same way with belief that they would not default. Markets
only re-priced debt after the 2007-2009 financial crisis as differences in credit risks
became obvious. Though short-term rates in advanced non-EZ countries are mostly
dominated by country-specific shocks, long term rates are highly regionally influenced,
and in some instances more than average EZ levels. The conditions that set long term
bond rates do not differ among advanced European countries. Advanced countries
such as Denmark, Sweden and UK seem to have continued the process of regional
financial integration even outside the common currency area.
In fact Stiglitz (2010) argues that by itself full financial integration is not optimal
because if underlying technologies are not convex as is often assumed, moves towards
risk-sharing can lower expected utility for integrated countries.
Similar mixed findings were obtained in industrial production and consumer prices.
While Advanced EU countries have high industrial and price convergence, boosting
consumption risk sharing, Periphery countries go the opposite direction in most in-
stances. Also while emerging EU countries appear to meet the OCA criterion of
similarity in industrial structures, periphery countries again go the opposite direc-
tion.
However, increased trade among members of integrated countries, another key
measure of real integration is not analyzed in this study. Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2010)
have shown that the introduction of the Euro did not result in a statistically significant
impact of trade on financial integration, even though it is highly correlated with
bilateral financial activities. Since this study uses the introduction of the Euro to
understand how real integration either propels or counteracts financial integration in
achieving consumption risk sharing, we do not reinvent the wheel by repeating a trade
analysis. Also any missed effects of trade integration analysis would likely show up
in reduced cross-border price differentials – real convergence that is already captured
in analyzing integration in consumer prices (also see (Lane, 2006)).
Among Advanced European countries, overall, real integration seems to corrobo-
rate financial integration in increasing consumption risk sharing. No clear-cut advan-
tage of Core Eurozone countries over other Advanced European countries is observed
in the study. However Periphery countries seem to continue to struggle to stay in the
EMU and diversify consumption risk after 20 years of its inception.
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Table 2.1: Regional and Global weights for decomposition
While some countries are constant in all decomposition of variables, others are not due to lack of
sufficient data. The estimates reported are GDP weighted averages, indicating the importance of
each country in the estimation. For each variable, weights should sum to 100 among both the
regional and world groups.
Country Stock Market Index Ind. Pro index Money Market rate Bond Rate CPI
Regional Group
Austria 2.54 2.54 2.54
Belgium 3.40 3.40 3.40
Finland 1.54 1.54 1.54
France 20.37 18.92 18.92 18.92 20.37
Germany 27.98 25.99 26.23 26.23 27.98
Italy 17.74 16.48 16.48 16.48 17.74
Luxembourg 0.24
Netherlands 5.39 5.39 5.38
Norway 1.75 1.74 1.74
Portugal 1.81 1.81 1.81
Spain 10.16 10.16
Sweden 3.18 3.18 3.18
Switzerland 3.53 3.53
United Kingdom 20.21 18.77 18.77 18.77 20.21
World Group
Australia 3.64 3.64 3.64
Canada 6.15 6.15 6.15 10
Japan 20.37 20 20.37 20.37 10
United States 69.83 80 69.83 69.83 70
China 10
Source: Author’s computation using GDP (PPP) data from Penn World Tables 9.0
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Table 2.2: Stationarity tests
The table reports results of unit roots tests using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller procedure. BIC
optimal lags are also reported for each test performed. H0: Series has unit roots. H1: Series is
stationary. Critical values are ≈ -3.42 and -3.99 at the 5% and 1% levels of significance
respectively for models with trend (stock, industrial production and CPI) and ≈ -3.87 and -3.45
for the interest rates data. (*) and (**) are significance at 5% and 1%.
Money Market BondMarket Stock Market Ind. Pro CPI
Country/Group ADF Lags ADF Lags ADF Lags ADF Lags ADF Lags
Region -1.35 0 -0.67 3 -2.76 1 -3.34 5 0.81 3
Globe -1.92 3 -1.81 1 -2.53 1 -2.11 4 -2.12 2
Albania -6.70∗∗ 2
Armenia -5.11∗∗ 4
Austria -1.39 1 -0.93 1 -2.50 1 -2.50 5 0.26 5
Azerbaijan -6.23∗∗ 2
Belgium -1.91 1 -0.18 3 -2.92 1 -4.43∗∗ 5 0.03 5
Bulgaria -3.35∗ 4 -2.27 2 -1.76 1
Croatia -3.87∗ 0 -2.53 4 -2.59 1
Cyprus -4.33∗∗ 3 0.78 0
Czech Republic -2.13 2 -1.56 2 -2.55 2 -3.53∗ 4 -6.11∗∗ 0
Denmark -1.84 4 -1.28 1 -3.39 1 -3.78∗ 4 -1.31 1
Estonia -1.73 4 -2.76 1 -2.71 2 -4.99 4
Finland -2.23 2 -1.02 1 -1.94 1 -2.68 5 0.25 5
France -1.64 3 -0.25 1 -2.12 1 -4.17∗∗ 5 0.64 3
Greece -6.12∗∗ 3 -1.46 2 -2.29 1 -3.26 2 1.65 5
Germany -2.70 4 -0.51 3 -3.02 1 -3.25 5 0.49 2
Georgia -2.23 0
Hungary -2.00 1 -1.17 2 -1.83 3 -1.90 4 1.36 2
Iceland -3.06∗ 1 -2.40 0 -2.18 3 -2.29 2 -0.04 5
Italy -0.67 1 -2.11 1 -2.07 1 -3.85∗ 5 0.47 4
Ireland -2.53 4 -0.82 1 -1.89 1 -2.52 4 -3.98∗∗ 5
Latvia -1.17 1 -5.38∗∗ 0 -6.70∗∗ 2
Lithuania -4.61∗∗ 2 -6.40∗∗ 0 -9.18∗∗ 1
Luxembourg -1.31 1 -0.57 1 -2.52 1 -3.69∗ 5 1.01 5
Malta -0.14 0
Moldova -5.82∗∗ 1
Norway -1.10 0 -1.40 1 -3.40 1 -2.59 4 1.56 0
Netherlands -1.85 1 -0.49 1 -2.10 1 -4.35∗∗ 5 -0.03 5
Poland -5.57∗∗ 3 -2.17 1 -2.88 1 -1.55 4 -3.87∗ 3
Portugal -2.03 0 -1.75 3 -1.97 1 -1.47 5 2.29 1
Romania -3.39∗ 0 -3.72∗ 3 -5.65∗∗ 1
Serbia -1.87 1
Russia -6.14∗∗ 2 -1.95 1 -4.28∗∗ 2 -6.09 2
Sweden -2.87∗ 5 -1.17 1 -2.08 1 -3.16 5 2.07 1
Slovakia -2.30 1 -2.86 4 -2.02 1
Slovenia -7.65∗∗ 3 -2.16 1 -1.83 3 -3.58∗ 3 -1.12 4
Spain -1.61 4 -0.93 1 -2.31 2 -2.56 5 1.14 5
Switzerland -0.47 1 -2.28 1
Turkey -1.34 1 -6.04∗∗ 1 -1.07 5
Ukraine -3.23∗ 4 -4.22∗∗ 0 -6.68∗∗ 4
United Kingdom -1.65 2 -0.86 2 -1.73 3 -3.17 5 0.62 3
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Table 2.3: Country grouping and corresponding list
Country Groups list
Core Eurozone (EZ) Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg,
Netherlands
Periphery EZ Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain
Late-Comer EZ Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Slovakia,
Slovenia
Advanced EU Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom
Emerging EU Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep., Hungary, Poland, Romania
Advanced non-EU Iceland, Norway, Switzerland
Emerging non-EU Albania, Azerbaijan, Turkey, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine
Advanced Europe Core EZ, Advanced EU, and Advanced non-EU
Periphery Europe Periphery EZ
Emerging Europe Newcomer EZ, Emerging EU, and Emerging non-EU
World (RoW) Australia, Canada, Japan, USA, and China
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Table 2.4: Overview of Data
This table describes the data for various country groups in Europe and the World group over the
period January 1960-December 2018. Data is at the monthly frequency and the unit of observation
is the Country. Stock index is not seasonally adjusted but industrial production is. MEI =
Monthly Monetary and Financial Statistics. Indexes are defined as follows: Stock market and
Industrial production (Index 2015=100); Consumer price (Index 2010=100). Money and bond
market rates are in percent.
Variables Mean Med. S.D. Min. Max.
Advanced Countries
Stock market index 47.32 30.55 53.26 0.52 697.88
Industrial production index 74.74 75.87 28.12 12.01 147.11
Money market rate 5.58 4.58 4.85 -1.04 82.38
Bond market rate 5.81 5.42 3.28 -0.54 17.32
Consumer price index 60.61 63.43 33.72 0.04 127.73
Periphery Countries
Stock market index 81.29 62.68 102.93 0.98 815.84
Industrial production index 80.22 89.66 35.24 7.94 221.44
Money market rate 6.43 4.35 6.28 -0.33 67.23
Bond market rate 7.23 5.44 4.40 0.32 29.24
Consumer price index 50.92 53.25 39.11 1.11 111.60
Emerging Countries
Stock market index 70.12 71.49 48.80 0.00 349.48
Industrial production index 92.15 94.45 25.88 28.34 187.36
Money market rate 11.04 5.56 14.94 -0.50 93.54
Bond market rate 6.21 5.01 8.36 0.10 110.55
Consumer price index 63.86 66.13 43.70 0 273.02
World Group
Stock market index 46.17 37.09 38.04 2.98 184.33
Industrial production index 74.27 76.93 29.08 11.26 123.99
Money market rate 3.87 3.53 3.68 -0.06 19.10
Bond market rate 5.55 5.21 3.35 -0.23 17
Consumer price index 67.42 78.23 31.32 13.22 122.74
a. Stock market index: total share prices for all shares in a country b. Industrial production index:
measures real output in manufacturing, mining, and electric & gas c. Money (bond) market rates:
short-term (long-term) interest rates, % per annum d. Consumer price index: a market weight of
all consumer prices
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Figure 2.1: Plots of the 5 Variables
Trends in the data tended towards convergence in the mid-2000s; Emerging countries results need
to be interpreted with care since they exhibit marked differences from the rest of the groups.
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Figure 2.2: Kernel Density Estimation for Industrial Production
(a) Industrial structure of Core EZ, Advanced EU (non-EZ), Advanced non-EU,
and the rest-of-world groups
(b) Newcomer EZ, and Emerging countries both in and out of the EU have
approximately similar industrial structures
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Table 2.5: Decomposition of Money Market Rates
This table provides the results of variance decomposition of short-term interest rates. Results are
compiled at the 12-month forecast horizon.
country Pre− EMU EMU period EMU pre− Crisis
Month ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud]
Core EZ
Austria 12 17 (40) [43] 19 (74) [7] 18 (75) [7]
Belgium 12 11 (14) [75] 19 (74) [7] 18 (76) [6]
Finland 12 23 (40) [37] 19 (74) [7] 18 (76) [6]
France 12 4 (33) [63] 19 (74) [7] 18 (76) [6]
Germany 12 13 (43) [44] 19 (74) [7] 19 (75) [6]
Luxembourg 12 20 (74) [6] 19 (77) [4]
Netherlands 12 6 (54) [40] 19 (74) [7] 18 (74) [8]
Periphery EZ
Estonia 12 9 (9) [82] 12 (13) [75]
Greece 12 12 (2) [86] 1 (68) [31] 8 (42) [50]
Ireland 12 14 (56) [30] 17 (73) [10] 17 (69) [14]
Italy 12 8 (67) [25] 19 (74) [7] 19 (74) [7]
Lithuania 12 16 (41) [43] 47 (4) [49]
Slovenia 12 9 (61) [30] 8 (54) [38]
Spain 12 13 (28) [59] 18 (75) [7] 17 (78) [5]
Advanced EU
Denmark 12 7 (4) [89] 13 (33) [54] 20 (64) [16]
Sweden 12 15 (11) [74] 70 (5) [25] 84 (1) [15]
United Kingdom 12 9 (26) [65] 6 (31) [63] 5 (18) [77]
Emerging EU
Bulgaria 12 1 (8) [91] 88 (6) [6]
Czech Republic 12 1 (2) [97] 18 (25) [57]
Croatia 12 2 (62) [36] 32 (31) [37]
Hungary 12 9 (5) [86] 45 (30) [25]
Poland 12 4 (2) [94] 4 (9) [87]
Romania 12 5 (7) [88] 87 (5) [8]
Advanced non-EU
Iceland 12 48 (6) [46] 54 (1) [45] 42 (26) [32]
Norway 12 5 (55) [40] 15 (55) [30] 9 (53) [38]
Switzerland 12 1 (13) [86] 16 (51) [33] 15 (48) [37]
Emerging non-EU
Armenia 12 18 (34) [48] 10 (9) [81] 25 (14) [61]
Georgia 12 36 (43) [21]
Serbia 12 12 (2) [86]
Ukraine 12 5 (2) [93] 6 (1) [93]
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Table 2.6: Decomposition of Bond Market Rates
This table provides the results of variance decomposition of 10-year government bond rates.
Results are compiled at the 12-month forecast horizon.
country Pre− EMU EMU period EMU pre− Crisis
Month ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud]
Core EZ
Austria 12 30 (41) [29] 57 (36) [7] 54 (42) [4]
Belgium 12 37 (48) [15] 34 (58) [8] 47 (51) [2]
Finland 12 23 (52) [25] 47 (33) [20] 33 (58) [9]
France 12 27 (50) [23] 53 (41) [6] 48 (51) [1]
Germany 12 46 (41) [13] 68 (21) [11] 50 (41) [9]
Luxembourg 12 24 (23) [53] 32 (31) [37] 24 (43) [33]
Netherlands 12 42 (48) [10] 57 (33) [9] 56 (42) [2]
Periphery EZ
Italy 12 16 (56) [28] 11 (55) [34] 47 (50) [3]
Ireland 12 18 (75) [7] 19 (24) [57] 51 (43) [6]
Latvia 12 15 (12) [73] 1 (1) [98]
Lithuania 12 22 (11) [67] 3 (5) [92]
Slovakia 12 25 (19) [56] 6 (22) [72]
Slovenia 12 10 (55) [35] 4 (38) [58]
Greece 12 42 (38) [20] 2 (3) [95] 21 (47) [32]
Portugal 12 21 (72) [7] 2 (33) [65] 49 (43) [8]
Spain 12 7 (80) [13] 12 (46) [42] 48 (48) [4]
Advanced EU
Denmark 12 31 (62) [7] 44 (28) [28] 38 (56) [6]
Sweden 12 22 (65) [13] 64 (21) [15] 38 (58) [4]
United Kingdom 12 35 (42) [23] 56 (17) [27] 41 (38) [21]
Emerging EU
Czech Republic 12 23 (5) [72] 21 (24) [55]
Poland 12 29 (7) [64] 17 (40) [43]
Hungary 12 7 (10) [83] 7 (18) [75]
Advanced non-EU
Iceland 12 7 (14) [79] 2 (3) [95] 12 (1) [87]
Norway 12 28 (34) [38] 52 (20) [28] 20 (49) [31]
Switzerland 12 24 (40) [36] 62 (22) [16] 51 (33) [16]
Emerging non-EU
Russia 12 3 (9) [88] 12 (12) [76]
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Table 2.7: Decomposition of Stock Market Index
This table provides the results of variance decomposition of stock market index. Results are
compiled at the 12-month forecast horizon.
country Pre− EMU EMU period EMU pre− Crisis
Month ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud]
Core EZ
Austria 12 7 (32) [61] 82 (1) [17] 34 (19) [47]
Belgium 12 47 (19) [34] 81 (4) [15] 56 (1) [43]
Finland 12 15 (25) [60] 57 (21) [22] 49 (27) [24]
France 12 40 (24) [36] 78 (20) [2] 84 (12) [4]
Germany 12 18 (53) [29] 69 (17) [14] 71 (9) [20]
Luxembourg 12 79 (2) [19] 56 (9) [35]
Netherlands 12 43 (24) [33] 87 (11) [2] 72 (7) [21]
Periphery EZ
Estonia 12 11 (1) [88] 67 (2) [31]
Slovakia 12 2 (1) [97] 5 (4) [91]
Slovenia 12 5 (7) [88] 56 (2) [42]
Greece 12 8 (3) [89] 56 (2) [42] 48 (4) [48]
Italy 12 25 (50) [25] 67 (18) [15] 56 (15) [29]
Ireland 12 51 (14) [35] 79 (3) [18] 30 (8) [62]
Portugal 12 28 (24) [48] 66 (9) [25] 40 (30) [30]
Spain 12 37 (17) [46] 64 (22) [14] 70 (17) [13]
Advanced EU
Denmark 12 19 (31) [50] 71 (6) [23] 52 (6) [42]
Sweden 12 25 (21) [54] 77 (16) [7] 77 (18) [5]
United Kingdom 12 56 (12) [32] 87 (4) [9] 94 (3) [3]
Emerging EU
Czech Republic 12 7 (5) [88] 78 (4) [18]
Hungary 12 12 (31) [57] 61 (2) [37]
Poland 12 12 (10) [78] 82 (6) [12]
Advanced non-EU
Iceland 12 11 (20) [69] 56 (2) [42] 41 (6) [53]
Norway 12 11 (25) [64] 89 (0) [11] 64 (1) [35]
Switzerland 12 38 (29) [33] 67 (9) [24] 78 (1) [21]
Emerging non-EU
Russia 12 49 (3) [48] 11 (7) [82]
Turkey 12 4 (13) [84] 39 (12) [49] 39 (14) [47]
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Table 2.8: Decomposition of Industrial Production Index
This table provides the results of variance decomposition of industrial production index. Results
are compiled at the 12-month forecast horizon.
country Pre− EMU EMU period EMU pre− Crisis
Month ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud]
Core EZ
Austria 12 19 (24) [57] 16 (46) [38] 31 (36) [33]
Belgium 12 36 (7) [57] 21 (3) [76] 41 (14) [45]
Finland 12 27 (60) [13] 21 (31) [48] 29 (26) [45]
France 12 27 (2) [71] 35 (23) [42] 37 (27) [36]
Germany 12 14 (61) [25] 19 (52) [29] 24 (42) [34]
Luxembourg 12 39 (18) [43] 16 (13) [71] 12 (16) [72]
Netherlands 12 22 (12) [66] 10 (10) [80] 8 (21) [71]
Periphery EZ
Cyprus 12 29 (6) [65] 16 (3) [81]
Estonia 12 33 (27) [40] 22 (32) [46]
Italy 12 26 (22) [52] 15 (29) [56] 19 (49) [32]
Ireland 12 34 (9) [57] 10 (10) [80] 26 (22) [52]
Latvia 12 72 (2) [26] 27 (5) [68]
Lithuania 12 3 (3) [94] 4 (8) [88]
Slovakia 12 16 (21) [63] 29 (53) [18]
Slovenia 12 36 (46) [18] 31 (51) [18]
Greece 12 28 (7) [65] 35 (3) [62] 29 (12) [59]
Portugal 12 16 (19) [65] 11 (12) [77] 11 (11) [78]
Spain 12 19 (31) [50] 11 (15) [74] 14 (11) [75]
Advanced EU
Denmark 12 40 (11) [49] 33 (9) [58] 34 (22) [44]
Sweden 12 2 (1) [97] 41 (37) [22] 38 (41) [21]
United Kingdom 12 21 (62) [17] 23 (40) [37] 20 (36) [44]
Emerging EU
Bulgaria 12 9 (9) [82] 15 (16) [69]
Croatia 12 5 (32) [63] 12 (32) [56]
Czech Republic 12 68 (10) [22] 21 (26) [53]
Hungary 12 11 (11) [78] 31 (54) [15]
Poland 12 15 (14) [71] 18 (46) [36]
Romania 12 6 (10) [84] 18 (21) [61]
Advanced non-EU
Iceland 12 13 (8) [79] 13 (6) [81]
Norway 12 26 (57) [17] 30 (11) [59] 26 (27) [47]
Emerging non-EU
Russia 12 7 (15) [78] 7 (20) [73] 85 (7) [8]
Turkey 12 40 (6) [54] 25 (5) [70] 76 (4) [20]
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Table 2.9: Decomposition of Consumer Price Index
This table provides the results of variance decomposition of consumer price index. Results are
compiled at the 12-month forecast horizon.
country Pre− EMU EMU period EMU pre− Crisis
Month ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud] ug (ur) [ud]
Core EZ
Austria 12 11 (8) [81] 17 (28) [55] 37 (24) [39]
Belgium 12 31 (2) [67] 51 (15) [34] 33 (31) [36]
Finland 12 44 (4) [52] 15 (39) [46] 18 (38) [44]
France 12 33 (9) [58] 27 (54) [19] 29 (59) [12]
Germany 12 21 (27) [52] 24 (51) [25] 43 (24) [33]
Luxembourg 12 25 (6) [69] 15 (50) [35] 18 (40) [42]
Netherlands 12 8 (2) [90] 18 (18) [64] 9 (16) [75]
Periphery EZ
Cyprus 12 15 (12) [73] 14 (28) [58]
Estonia 12 22 (0) [78] 34 (32) [34]
Italy 12 56 (29) [15] 47 (21) [32] 30 (15) [55]
Ireland 12 70 (6) [24] 29 (2) [69] 70 (12) [18]
Latvia 12 9 (51) [40] 4 (13) [83]
Lithuania 12 0 (2) [98] 9 (1) [90]
Malta 12 1 (0) [99] 24 (37) [39]
Slovakia 12 43 (1) [56] 26 (18) [56]
Slovenia 12 62 (9) [29] 23 (15) [62]
Greece 12 19 (6) [75] 14 (52) [34] 9 (59) [32]
Portugal 12 56 (17) [27] 18 (49) [33] 31 (11) [58]
Spain 12 51 (8) [41] 17 (11) [72] 25 (8) [67]
Advanced EU
Denmark 12 9 (5) [86] 32 (40) [28] 33 (44) [23]
Sweden 12 39 (15) [46] 12 (48) [40] 5 (63) [32]
United Kingdom 12 17 (11) [72] 15 (41) [44] 14 (42) [44]
Emerging EU
Bulgaria 12 4 (1) [95] 11 (30) [59]
Croatia 12 54 (20) [26] 6 (34) [60]
Czech Republic 12 45 (11) [44] 26 (15) [59]
Poland 12 76 (0) [24] 15 (4) [81]
Hungary 12 33 (22) [45] 38 (17) [45]
Romania 12 23 (18) [59] 19 (0) [81]
Advanced non-EU
Iceland 12 53 (6) [41] 4 (22) [74] 20 (15) [65]
Norway 12 19 (5) [76] 7 (18) [75] 9 (41) [50]
Switzerland 12 36 (32) [32] 21 (11) [68] 16 (18) [66]
Emerging non-EU
Albania 12 41 (37) [22] 76 (16) [8] 78 (7) [15]
Azerbaijan 12 9 (18) [73] 98 (1) [1] 59 (2) [39]
Moldova 12 2 (70) [28] 5 (17) [78] 6 (2) [92]
Russia 12 59 (10) [31] 6 (6) [88] 4 (13) [83]
Serbia 12 18 (36) [46] 6 (1) [93] 2 (11) [87]
Turkey 12 2 (5) [93] 1 (10) [89] 15 (11) [74]
Ukraine 12 5 (15) [80] 92 (5) [3] 48 (27) [25]
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Chapter 3: Do managers play it safe? Managerial cash bonus and financial
leverage
3.1 Introduction
Early research posit that professional managers are risk-averse, because of their
overinvestment incentive problem (Hölmstrom, 1979; Fama, 1980). Thus, when man-
agers’ residual interests (i.e. financial wealth and employment prospects) are high,
they become risk conscious and tend to avoid corporate policies that they consider
to exacerbate overall firm risk. Consequently, such aberrant behavioral imbalances
of managers can hurt shareholders’ value. Following this, financial economists theo-
rized that through efficient compensation contracts, managerial risk-related incentive
problem is reduced, thereby influencing managers to make value-critical decisions re-
lating to investment and the concomitant financing policies (Mehran, 1995; Guay,
1999; Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). Although, prior scholarly
managerial compensation literature primarily focus on agency conflicts with equity-
holders (i.e. shareholders’ use of stock incentives to induce managerial risk-taking),
Coles et al. (2006), Berger et al. (1997), Berger and Nitsch (2008), and Harris and
Raviv (1979) observe that heavily cash-motivated managers are often risk-averse and
that they tend to prefer cash pay to equity (Harris and Raviv, 1979) because such
component minimizes uncontrolled uncertainties (Liu and Stark, 2009) to their overall
economic wealth.
It can be inferred from the above observation that the distinctive nature of com-
pensation types poses different risk-related incentives to managers. Particularly, risk-
averse managers may have incentives to reduce firm risks via keeping low leverage
ratios (Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Fama, 1980; Grossman and Hart, 1982). Again,
because a high debt level increases a firm’s financial distress and bankruptcy risks
which risk-averse managers seek to prevent (Grossman and Hart, 1982), and reduces
cash flows via interest payment (Jensen, 1986), it can be argued that a relatively
higher proportion of managerial earnings-based incentives would provide more risk-
avoiding incentive to managers. This, in turn, increases bondholders value leading
to possibly lower agency costs of debt (John and John, 1993). Thus, shareholders
use low risk incentive (e.g. cash bonus) to resolve shareholder-bondholder conflict of
interests. More specifically, we examine how providing managers with earnings-based
incentive induces them to limit firm risk levels (via lower borrowings).
The key rationale is that the use of cash bonus is to provide further incentive to
risk-averse managers to generate positive and stable cash flow which in turn may lead
to lower debt usage. Implicit in this idea is the notion that managerial cash bonus
compensation and accounting earnings are related to affect leverage level. Further,
the study argues that high growth firms may tend to use less cash bonus, and this
can consequently affect how cash-motivated managers adopt debt policy. We also
contend that cash-motivated managers with higher ownership stakes are likely to be
more concerned and may use debt more conservatively. Lastly, as an extension of
Duru et al. (2005) model, we adopt a simultaneous equations model to specifically
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account for the joint determination of cash bonus and leverage. This is the first study
that has responded explicitly to leverage and cash bonus endogeneity problem and
that investigating the aforementioned issues in the U.K. context is urgently needed for
these reasons. For instance, the U.K firms are seen to have a conservative debt policy
(Antoniou et al., 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 1995) and that their executives often
receive substantial cash-based compensation (Murphy, 2000; Conyon and Murphy,
2000). Anecdotally, it can be argued that the low debt status of the U.K firms could
be attributed to the U.K shareholders usage of more earnings-based bonuses. Hence,
the unique characteristics of the U.K publicly listed firms provide a natural setting
to extend Antoniou et al. (2008) low-leverage propositions. The advancement of the
literature is based on the achievement of the stated objectives.
The findings in this paper suggest that managerial cash bonus compensation neg-
atively impacts firm leverage, generally consistent with our first hypothesis. Our evi-
dence further reveals that the adverse effect of cash bonus on leverage is unlikely to be
moderated by accounting earnings performance measurement choice. In addition, we
show that executives with more cash bonus in both high and low growth-opportunities
firms are likely to increase leverage. Finally, the results show that cash-incentivised
executives with lower ownership significantly use more borrowings, however, they be-
come reluctant to increase leverage at higher ownership level, signaling entrenchment
effect at higher ownership level. Overall, the findings of this study add to a growing
body of literature that contribute to the risk-related story of managerial compensation
components on financial leverage policy (Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam,
2010; Kini and Williams, 2012). The remainder of the paper is structured along this
line: Section 3.2 reviews related literature and formulates testable hypotheses. Sec-
tion 3.3 considers data and empirical methods. Section 3.4 presents and discusses
three-stage least squares regression results and further robustness checks, and finally
section 3.5 concludes the study.
3.2 Related Literature and Hypothesis Development
Much of the early research on compensation policy indirectly show how the differ-
ent compensation components relate to observable managerial decisions. For instance,
some researchers suggest possible associations between the various characteristics of
firms and compensation pay components. Essentially, the idea is that shareholders
consider the nature of firms’ assets (tangible asset, growth opportunities), financial
policies, presence of monitoring mechanisms (e.g. independent boards, board com-
position, large institutional shareholdings), the characteristics of product markets,
and regulatory and institutional changes (e.g. Cadbury, 1992; Greenbury, 1995) in
order to optimize the value-maximizing effects of managerial compensation scheme
(see Kim et al., 2017; Amoako-Adu et al., 2011; Brockman et al., 2010; Ortiz-Molina,
2007; Ryan Jr and Wiggins III, 2002, among others). In a related manner, another
stream of literature further claim that if through compensation contract, professional
managers become more benevolent to shareholders, then there should be an observ-
able relation between firm performance and the structure of managerial compensation
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scheme. Some scholarly studies provide support for this view (Chen et al., 2016; Core
et al., 1999; Mehran, 1995).
However, different from the above models, we contend that the various compo-
nents of managerial compensation offer different incentives to managers which could
affect their selection of operational and financial policies of the firms. Thus, if pro-
fessional managers are risk-averse (Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Fama, 1980), which
can consequently inhibit their policy choices and value, then the design and usage of
incentive pay package should provide direct incentives to executives to choose value-
critical policies. Some empirical research provide support for this view and that this
literature has significantly concentrated on managerial stock-based compensation on
risk-taking policies. There is some evidence that suggest that the convexity feature
inherent in option-based incentives induce managers to embark on more risky policies.
For example, Coles et al. (2006) find that the contemporaneous option-based incen-
tive (measured as the volatility of CEOs stock-based - vega) has a positive effect on
leverage, firm risk, research & development activity. Also, Kini and Williams (2012)
share similar sentiment after finding a positive (negative) link between option-like
tournament incentives and book leverage, research & development (capital expendi-
ture) and interpret it to suggest that senior managers engage in more risk-taking in
order to increase their promotion to CEO rank.
Relatedly, Chava and Purnanandam (2010) also show that the value of CEOs
option-based - vega (delta) compensation increases (decreases) with firm leverage
level. They argued that shareholders use a combination of different pay package
schemes to either increase or decrease managerial risk-related agency problem. Simi-
larly, Chen et al. (2006) provide support that risk-motivated incentive (options com-
pensation) encourages executives in the banking industry to take more risk policies,
whiles Wu and Tu (2007) contend that option-based incentive influences aggressive
allocation of corporate resources into research and development activity. Again, and
along the same lines, Holthausen et al. (1995) also find that CEOs equity-based com-
pensation explains the firm’s subsequent innovative activity after adopting a system of
equations approach. In contrast, others offer different observations (see Hayes et al.,
2012; Lewellen, 2006). For example, Hayes et al. (2012) observe that the sensitivity
of CEO wealth to stock volatility (vega) and the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock
price (delta) encourage more managerial risk-reduction behavior in both financial
and investment policies. Their results show that stock-based incentives rather reduce
firms’ debt ratio and risky R&D investment. They also find that the risk-motivated
incentive inherent in option-based induces lower cash holding. Again, Lewellen (2006)
contend that managers’ preference for risk-taking activity (i.e. debt ratio) declines as
their stock options holdings are in the money.
Furthermore, others also provide evidence on how risk-avoiding incentives affect
corporate policies. Specifically, Firth et al. (2016) empirically analyze the sensitivity
of CEOs inside-debt incentives on the costs of equity capital using the Standard
and Poor’s data sets spanning 2006 to 2013. They document that CEOs debt-like
incentives have a significantly negative effect on the cost of equity and carefully argued
that debt-like pay component lower managerial risk aggressive behavior leading to
lower demand by investors. The authors further asserted that the negative effect
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is more pronounced for shareholders of firms with high bankruptcy risk. Similarly,
Cassell et al. (2012) find a significantly negative relation between CEOs inside debt
holdings (defined as pension benefits and deferred pay) and financial leverage, R&D,
and volatility of firm stock returns. They explain that shareholders’ usage of more
CEOs inside debt-like pay induce lower risk policies. Kabir and Veld-Merkoulova
(2013) apply a relatively more comprehensive CEOs pay components and argue that
bondholders incorporate the nature of CEO’s pay incentives when lending to the U.K
firms. The authors made this conclusion after applying OLS estimator to their model
and find that cash bonus and defined pension incentives show a decreasing effect on
bond yield spread (cost of debt), while an increase in stock options intensify it. In
a similar vein, Florackis and Ozkan (2009) reveal a non-monotonic relation between
firm leverage and CEOs ownership after applying different estimating techniques,
while both Friend and Lang (1988) and Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) show a negative
effect of managerial ownership on a firm’s debt level and suggest that CEOs become
wary of debt levels when their residual interest is high.
As indicated, however, others have examined the reverse issue: i.e. whether share-
holders consider firm strategic policies (investment, leverage, cash holdings etc.) when
designing managerial optimal compensation. More specifically, this strand of research
looks at the role of firm’s observable characteristics in explaining optimal compensa-
tion (Papa and Speciale, 2011; Brockman et al., 2010; Ortiz-Molina, 2007; Duru et al.,
2005). For instance, Brockman et al. (2010) show a positive effect of short-term debt
on the sensitivity of CEOs wealth to stock return volatility (vega) but report a neg-
ative effect on the sensitivity of CEOs wealth to stock price (delta). They interpret
to show that short-term debt intensifies shareholders - bondholders agency conflicts,
but stock (delta) incentive minimizes such conflicting interests. Ortiz-Molina (2007)
further argues that shareholders usage of stock-based incentives helps reduce equity-
debt agency conflicts after reporting an increasing effect of leverage on stock options
incentive. Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2002) report a positive (negative) effect of debt
ratio on cash bonus (stock and stock options), while Papa and Speciale (2011) find
similar positive association between leverage and cash compensation. Again, and
with similar sentiment, Duru et al. (2005) assert that corporate debtholders incorpo-
rate managerial risk-avoiding cash incentive when deciding lending rate after finding a
negative effect of corporate bond yields on cash bonus. They also find a positive effect
of leverage on cash bonus and explicitly argue of the existing endogeneity concerns
among leverage and cash bonus.
Clearly, these two independent strands of literature reviewed above show the ex-
istence of endogeneity bias and possible causation problems in the empirical design.
In response, and departing from extant literature, our basic model is that sharehold-
ers choose earnings-based compensation to induce managerial optimal risk reduction
attitude (i.e. lower optimal leverage) and that such efficient financial leverage policy
together with other firms’ characteristics determine the probability distribution of a
firm’s accounting earnings and stock returns. Thus, our chosen model accounts for
the simultaneous determination of leverage and managerial cash bonus in an attempt
to address the empirical design problems and to avoid possible spurious inferences and
to isolate causation effect that runs from cash bonus to affect leverage policy. Again,
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we further argue that managerial cash bonus compensation and financial leverage is
accentuated by the firm’s accounting earnings performance. In the same vein, we con-
tend that a firm’s growth opportunities and managerial ownership stakes are likely to
moderate cash bonus - leverage relationship. This paper adds to the limited research
that explore the impact of managerial cash bonus on financial leverage by accounting
for the existence of possible reverse causality among financial leverage and managerial
cash compensation.
Managerial cash bonus and firm leverage
It is argued that the distinctive nature of managerial compensation components
poses different corporate risk-taking behavior to managers (Kabir and Veld-Merkoulova,
2013; Cassell et al., 2012; Kini and Williams, 2012; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010;
Coles et al., 2006). Thus, market-based performance rewards (stock-based compo-
nent) induce professional managers risk-taking incentive while earnings-based com-
pensation discourages risk-taking appetite (Duru et al., 2005; Coles et al., 2006; Harris
and Raviv, 1979). For instance, Liu and Stark (2009) find an increasing relation be-
tween accounting earnings measures and managerial cash bonus compensation. A
simple inference from this is that, shareholders usage of accounting-based earnings
tend to influence managers to generate positive and stable cash flow, which in turn,
enable them to receive cash bonus rewards. Again, as the firm generates and holds
more cash flows, it can be able to sponsor activities via cash reserves leading to
lower debt contraction. Consequently, bondholders’ interest is safeguarded result-
ing in lower agency costs of debt (John and John, 1993). In a related vein, Harris
and Raviv (1979) argue that risk-averse managers prefer to have their compensation
structured in such a way that it bears minimal uncertainties to their economic wealth.
In tune with this, it is argued that executive boards cash compensation is implicitly
protected from uncertainties (Liu and Stark, 2009). From this intuitive argument, it
can be postulated that risk-averse managers who want to lower leverage level may
prefer earnings-based pay to stock-based compensation. In this regard, shareholders
of firms that use more accounting cash bonuses may tend to experience lower leverage
levels.
Hypothesis 1: Managerial cash bonuses will be negatively related to firm leverage.
Managerial cash bonus, performance (ROA) and leverage
One of the key objectives of this paper is to test the validity underlying the
assumption that shareholders usage of risk-avoiding compensation (cash bonuses) en-
courages a lower leverage ratio. The hypothesized relationship does not, however,
pay attention to the interaction between managerial cash bonus and accounting earn-
ings. In fact, the literature on performance measurement choice in remuneration
contracts critically conditions executives cash bonus on the levels of accounting earn-
ings (Liu and Stark, 2009; Duru et al., 2005; Core and Guay, 1999). Liu and Stark
(2009) show that cash bonus and accounting earnings are positively related. Again,
with lower debt levels, firms are able to generate positive cash flow through higher
53
accounting earnings. Consistent with this observation, it seems to suggest that man-
agers of firms with earnings-based incentives are likely to achieve higher accounting
performance targets. We use return on asset (ROA) as our accounting performance
measure, similar to prior literature (Liu and Stark, 2009; Firth et al., 2006; Mehran,
1995). Therefore, following previous research, we argue that managerial cash bonus
and accounting earnings performance interact in a dynamic way to affect firm leverage
level. With this, we formulate our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Earnings performance (ROA) negatively accentuates (moderates) the
relationship between cash bonus and financial leverage.
Managerial cash bonus, growth opportunities and leverage
The literature on managerial compensation provide different perspectives on the
role of firms’ growth opportunities. For example, Ryan Jr and Wiggins III (2002),
Bizjak et al. (1993) among others posit that firms with high growth opportunities tend
to use more equity-based but less cash bonuses because such firms need to reserve
enough cash surplus to sponsor future growth opportunities. Consistent with this
argument, it tends to suggest that firms with high growth opportunities are likely
to use lesser cash bonuses and this may consequently affect the assumed relation
between cash bonus and leverage. Therefore, following prior research (Ryan Jr and
Wiggins III, 2002; Smith Jr and Watts, 1992) assertion, we make a natural prediction
that managers of high growth opportunity firms are likely to face lower cash bonus
compensation. We formulate our third hypothesis as follows:
Hypothesis 3: The negative effect of cash bonus on leverage is smaller (bigger) for
firms with high (low) growth opportunities.
3.3 Method
Data
In order to test our stated hypotheses, we collected both managerial cash-based
compensation and the firm financial information for the sampled U.K FTSE 350 firms
spanning 2007 to 2015. Specifically, the dataset is obtained from two sources: we
manually collected data on managerial cash compensation, their ownership holdings,
ages and other corporate governance variables (large stakeholders and non-executives
ownership) from the firm’s annual reports, whiles accounting and financial data is
sourced from the COMPUSTAT database. Further, because firms operating in finan-
cial and utility industries tend to have different capital structure and often face other
regulatory constraints which may implicitly affect managerial decisions, we exclude
these firms (Coles et al., 2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010). Guided by this, we
base our analyses on a total number of 1,784 firm-year observations for the 213 firms
operating in nine industries over nine years period.
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Measurement of variables
Dependent Variable - Financial leverage
In line with other studies (e.g. Coles et al., 2006; Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Chava
and Purnanandam, 2010) financial leverage was used as our dependent variable. This
variable was measured as the ratio of total book value of debt to the book value of
total assets.
Independent Variable - Cash bonus
Consistent with Duru et al. (2005), we use natural log of total annual cash bonus
component of the executives (including CEO, CFO and COO - chief operating officer)
as a proxy for cash compensation – which is our main independent variable.
Control variables
Finally, we account for the following non-hypothesized control variables. These
include logarithm of sales to proxy for firm size (SZ); growth opportunities defined
as market value of assets to book value of assets to proxy for growth (GR); return
on assets (ROA) defined as EBITDA scaled by total assets; stock return shows the
firm annual stock return (STKR) over the fiscal year; financial distress (Z-score, Z-
SC) to proxy for probability of bankruptcy; tangibility defined as net investment in
property, plant and equipment (PPE) and research and development (R&D) scaled
by total assets for the respective measures. Indifferent to the prior work (Coles et al.,
2006; Chava and Purnanandam, 2010), we include executives salary (SAL) to proxy
for managerial risk aversion in our leverage model as a control variable. We argue that
executive salary poses a minimal risk-motivated incentive for managers (Bebchuk and
Fried, 2003). Also, we include fixed effect variables to account for industry and time
fixed effects. The acronyms and definitions of variables are provided in Table 3.1.
[Table 3.1 about here]
Model specification
In this section, we model the empirical relationship between cash compensation
and financial leverage. Specifically, we employ the following econometric framework:
Book leverageit = Cash bonusi,t + Controlsi,t−1 + αi + vt + νi,t (3.1)
The above regression equation is later modified to capture the moderating effects of
ROA and firm growth. First, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation is employed to
test the above relationship and to minimize reverse causality problem, by using lagged
values rather than the contemporaneous ones (Coles et al., 2006). However, since OLS
fails to account for unobserved firm-level heterogeneity and therefore leading to biased
estimates (Wooldridge, 2010), Fixed Effect (FE), Predicted method and Three-Stage
Least Squares (3SLS) methods are employed for robustness checks. All the results of
the analyses are presented in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.
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Summary Statistics and bivariate Correlations
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics of the variables used in this study. The
average executives’ cash-based compensation shows these mean values: total salary
is £1,414 million and that of cash bonus is £1,183 million. The average natural log
of salary and cash bonus show 6.09 and 5.89 respectively. The mean of book leverage
is 0.288 (i.e. 28.8% of the total assets). The other firm characteristics show the mean
values of return on assets (ROA), Z-score (Z-SC), market-to-book (GR), stock return
(STKR), and log sales (SZ) are 0.099, 1.539, 4.265, 0.066 and 9.013 respectively.
The tangibility (PPE) and R&D show about 24.0% and 0.6% of the total assets.
Further, on the ownership stakes, executives (EO), non-executives (NEO) and large
shareholders (LO) show average values 4.8%, 2.1% and 39.3% of the firm’s total
shareholdings. In Table 3.3, we present the correlation between all the variables used
in this study. In general, the evidence obtained from the correlation matrix, as well
as the descriptive statistics, suggest that our sample does not seem to suffer from any
serious issues such as multicollinearity, limited variation and heterogeneity or large
outliers.
[Tables 3.2 & 3.3 about here]
3.4 Results and Discussion
Univariate analysis
Table 3.4 shows univariate mean and standard deviation comparisons of firm and
manager-specific characteristics by leverage quartiles. To perform this, we segre-
gate firms into quartiles based on their leverage level and test whether the firm
and manager-related characteristics differ across low-leverage (1st quartile) and high-
leverage (4th quartile) levels. The mean cash-based compensation: salary in low-
leverage firms is lower than that in high-leverage firms while cash bonus in low-
leverage firms is higher than that in high-leverage firms. For the cash bonus, it is
plausible to argue that low-leverage firms spend less on interest payment, which in
turn, gives the firm a leeway to store enough cash balance and can motivate managers
using more cash bonuses. However, the mean differences marginally missed out on
significance.
Moreover, the findings on other firm characteristics are largely consistent with
most of the extant literature (see Florackis and Ozkan, 2009; Antoniou et al., 2008).
For instance, it shows that low-leverage firms normally have lower tangible assets,
higher performance (return on assets and stock return) higher growth (market-to-
book ratio) than high-leverage firms. Again, it is also observed that low-leverage
firms usually have larger R&D spending than the high-leverage ones. The reported
mean differences are all significant. The table further reveal that the mean values of
executive ownership and large shareholders in low-leverage firms are higher than that
of high-leverage ones, implying that managers and large shareholdings become risk
cautious as their residual interests go up (Florackis and Ozkan, 2009).
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In brief, the univariate analysis shows how cash incentives and other firm charac-
teristics behave across different leverage levels. However, the univariate analysis does
not effectively account for control variables. Also, as stated, endogeneity problem is
a major concern in the leverage – compensation empirical investigation (Duru et al.,
2005; Coles et al., 2006). These raised issues can affect the validity of the assumed
leverage-cash bonus relationship. To address this, we adopt efficient econometric
techniques to analyze the linkage.
[Table 3.4 about here]
The effect of cash bonus on leverage
The univariate analysis shows that the U.K executives pay considerable attention
to their earnings-based cash incentive when determining the leverage level. The sup-
posed anecdotal evidence fails to effectively control for other potential factors that
affect leverage choice. Also, as indicated earlier, managerial cash bonus and leverage
policy are likely to be jointly determined (Duru et al., 2005), rendering our univari-
ate results less likely to specifically quantify the magnitude of cash bonus effects on
leverage.
[Table 3.5 about here]
Table 3.5 presents the empirical results of our baseline model testing the effect of
cash bonus on leverage (LEV). We employed several estimation methods: OLS, FE,
predicted approach and Three-Stage Least Squares - 3SLS. Our main results are
based on OLS models 1 to 2 while FE, predicted and 3SLS techniques are used as
robustness checks. Specifically, model 2 shows that cash bonus is negatively and
significantly related to firm leverage. The reported coefficient estimates of -0.0210
(t-statistics -2.28), suggesting that an increase in cash bonus is associated with 2.1%
decrease in firm leverage. The finding confirms our assertion that shareholders usage
of earning-based compensation induces managerial risk-reduction incentive, thereby
lowering firm leverage (Coles et al., 2006; Harris and Raviv, 1991).
[Table 3.6 and 3.7 about here]
Robustness checks
Our estimated OLS models (1 & 2) of Table 3.5 consistently show that cash bonus
partly drives firm leverage level. Here, we further test if indeed our results are robust
to alternative econometric specifications. In Table 3.5 column 3, our fixed effect
estimator qualitatively reports similar coefficient on cash bonus, and it is statistically
significant at 1% confidence level. Further, in column 4, we again re-estimate our
model using Predicted approach. In this method, cash bonus is regressed on leverage
and control variables (controls defined in Table 3.1) to obtain predicted cash bonus
values and then use the predicted cash values in the leverage model. As shown, the
predicted model shows a cash bonus sign is still negative and statistically significant.
57
Moreover, it is worth mentioning that our key premise is that managerial com-
pensation (i.e. cash bonus) causes firm leverage policy. However, others suggest that
leverage also causes compensation policy. For example, some researchers argue that
shareholders of firms with high leverage will structure managerial compensation to
have high cash bonus, so that managers choose low leverage and shareholders bear
lower agency costs of financial distress (for instance see Duru et al., 2005; Ryan Jr
and Wiggins III, 2002; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016). This means that the issue of
direct causation may still remain a concern despite our various adopted techniques:
numerous control variables, lagged values of cash bonus, fixed effects and predicted
method. To further reduce the likelihood that our reported results are spurious and
to isolate the effects of leverage on cash bonus compensation, we adopt simultaneous
systems of equation. Table 3.6 shows results of a two-system specification. In each
model, the simultaneously determined variables are leverage and cash bonus. For
cash bonus model, we draw independent variables as well as instruments from previ-
ous studies (see Ryan Jr and Wiggins III, 2002; Duru et al., 2005; Kini and Williams,
2012; Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016). Based on theoretical economic intuition, our
chosen instruments are industry-median cash bonus, lagged values of ROA and stock
return (STKR). For instance, similar to Armstrong and Vashishtha (2012), we argue
that firms’ past performance (R0A, STKR) is likely to affect shareholders decisions to
use cash bonus to compensate managers which in turn can affect managerial leverage
policy. Again, our industry-median cash bonus instrument is consistent with Kini and
Williams (2012). The inclusion of instruments in our first-stage (CB) model allows
us to test for over-identifying restrictions and to improve the efficiency of coefficient
estimates. To conform to the underlying reasoning for simultaneous equations, we
use contemporaneous values of leverage and cash bonus and estimate using 3SLS
technique. Again, evidence obtained from our 3SLS results shows that the coefficient
sign on our independent variable (CB) remain qualitatively similar to what is already
reported in Table 3.5. In short, the 3SLS result suggests that our earlier findings are
not plagued by endogeneity problems and that the main results reported in Table 3.5
are robust to an alternative econometric specification.
Cash bonus and leverage - the moderating role of ROA
The evidence presented above suggests that managerial cash bonus induces man-
agers to decrease firm leverage. One key role of shareholders’ use of earning-based
cash bonus compensation is to provide an incentive for managers to generate more ac-
counting earnings making it easy for the firm to sponsor future activities from internal
sources. This tends to indicate that accounting performance is more sensitive to cash
bonus. Due to this, we further hypothesize that the adverse effects of managerial cash
bonus on leverage are likely to be accentuated by the firm’s earnings performance. In
Table 3.7, we argument our baseline specification by including the interaction term
of cash bonus and accounting performance. Similar to Firth et al. (2006) Firth, and
Kini and Williams (2012), we use return on asset (ROA) as a measure of performance.
Table 3.7, model 1 reports the results of our modified leverage equation while models
4-6 (FE) show the robustness checks. The results reveal that the estimated coefficient
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on the interaction term between cash bonus and ROA is negative and statistically sig-
nificant across all models. The finding suggests that, ceteris paribus, cash-motivated
managers with better earnings performance (ROA) are more likely to decrease firm
leverage. This lends support to the proposition that the use of risk-avoiding incentive
(earnings-based) induces managers to generate positive cash flow resulting in future
lower agency costs of debt.
Cash bonus and leverage - the moderating role of growth
We also hypothesized that the effect of managerial cash bonus on leverage is likely
to be moderated by the firm’s growth level because high growth firms tend to use less
cash bonus to reward their executives (Humphery-Jenner et al., 2016; Ryan Jr and
Wiggins III, 2002). Also, firms with growth opportunities often keep low leverage (Ra-
jan and Zingales, 1995). Thus, the interaction term is used to test the hypothesis that
firm growth is likely to affect leverage policy only through managerial cash incentives.
In Table 3.7 models 2 and 5, we extend our baseline model to accommodate for the in-
teraction term. Following prior research (Ryan Jr and Wiggins III, 2002; Coles et al.,
2006), we used market-to-book as a proxy for growth opportunities and then inter-
acted with cash bonus. Specifically, the interaction term coefficient shows a negative
sign and it is statistically significant at 1% confidence level. Thus, the coefficient esti-
mates is -0.0006 (t-statistics -4.88). The result tends to indicate that cash-motivated
managers with more growth potentials prefer to keep low leverage level. This is not
surprising because as managers of firms with accounting performance measure gener-
ates positive and stable cash surplus to meet performance evaluation criteria, they are
able to sponsor growth opportunities through internal source thereby limiting firm’s
leverage ratio. In other words, our evidence shows that through the incentive’s effects
of cash bonus, managers of firms with unexploited growth opportunities are likely to
enjoy a low leverage status.
3.5 Conclusion and Implications
In this paper, we examined how risk-avoiding incentive (earnings-based compen-
sation) affects firm financial leverage policy. Specifically, we concentrated on these
issues: (a) establish a direct causal effect of cash bonus on leverage, (b) the extent to
which firm’s earnings performance accentuates cash bonus and leverage relationship,
and (c) how shareholders of firms with growth opportunities use earnings-based incen-
tive to influence managerial leverage policy. Using U.K non-financial and non-utility
FTSE 350 datasets covering the period 2007 to 2015 and applying varied econometric
techniques, we found some interesting evidence. Consistent with our expectation,
we observed that the managerial cash bonus - leverage relationship is negative and
significant across all our models. In addition, our result shows that the adverse effect
of cash bonus on leverage is significantly accentuated by the firm’s earnings perfor-
mance. We further found evidence to indicate that through cash-motivated incentives
managers of growth potentials firms tend to hold low leverage status. Significantly,
the results are robust to all our adopted econometric specifications, including three-
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stage least squares (3SLS) which account for the simultaneous effects of managerial
cash bonus and the firm’s leverage policy.
Essentially, our results offer support for the risk-motivated argument under the
optimal compensation theory. The practical implication of the study’s evidence shows
that managerial cash bonus compensation (risk-avoiding incentives) is a useful mecha-
nism in influencing managerial risk reduction attitude. Thus, through earnings-based
compensation, the U.K managers are induced to reduce leverage level thereby leading
to possible future lower agency costs of debt. Again, the effect of managerial cash
bonus on leverage is further intensified by the firm’s performance and growth levels.
Overall, the supplied findings show that the U.K firms’ dominant use of cash-based in-
centive (Conyon and Murphy, 2000) partly explains the debt conservative behavior or
preference of these firms (Antoniou et al., 2008). However, our study has limitations
due to scope. There is some evidence, however, that other managerial policy choices
are likely to be influenced by higher cash compensation, we leave this extension for
future research.
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Table 3.1: Description of Variables
Dependent Variable Description Literature
Leverage (LEV) long-term debt plus short-
term debt scaled by Total
Assets
Coles et al. 2006; Chava
and Purnanandam, 2010
Independent variable
Cash bonus (CB) Natural logarithm of total
managerial cash bonus
Duru et al. 2005
Control variables
Salary (SAL) Natural logarithm of total
annual base salary of the
three executives
Cadman, Carter, and Hil-
legeist, 2010; Chen et al.
2016.
Firm Size (SZ) Natural logarithm of total
sales
Coles et al. 2006
Growth (GR) [Total Assets – Book Eq-
uity + Market Equity] /
Total Assets





EBITDA scaled by total as-
sets
Coles et al. 2006; Firth,
Fung and Rui, 2006; Flo-
rackis et al. 2009.
Annual stock re-
turn (STKR)
Annual stock return (12-
months period).
Coles et al. 2006
Research and De-
velopment (R&D)
R&D expense scaled by To-
tal Assets




Net Property, Plant and
Equipment / Total Assets




[ 3.3 (EBIT / Total Assets)
+ 1.0 (Sales / Total Assets)
+ 1.4 (Retained Profits /
Total Assets) + 1.2 (Work-






of the three executives
(CEO, CFO and Chief op-
erating officer) divided by
the firm’s total common
shareholdings
Florackis et al. 2009; Ryan












Total shareholdings of large
owners (defined as owner-
ship
Florackis et al. 2009; Ryan
and Wiggins, 2001; Core et
al. 1999
above 3%) scaled by the to-
tal common shareholdings
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistics
Mean St.
Dev.
Min Max 25% 50% 75% N
CB 5.89 0.55 0 7.19 5.7 5.95 6.17 1613
LEV 0.29 0.22 0 2.71 0.14 0.25 0.38 1606
SAL 6.1 0.21 5.08 6.96 5.96 6.09 6.24 1743
SZ 8.69 1.9 0 11.51 8.53 8.96 9.45 1738
GR 4.66 1.95 0 8.15 1.08 1.52 2.35 1746
ROA 0.1 0.19 -3.92 2.83 0.05 0.09 0.14 1712
STKR 0.06 0.49 -5.46 2.85 -0.13 0.09 0.3 1675
R&D 0.01 0.03 -0.3 0.41 0 0 0 1743
PPE 0.24 0.23 0 0.94 0.05 0.17 0.37 1664
Z-SC 1.52 1.24 -13.66 16.92 0.9 1.46 2.04 1740
EO 0.05 0.22 0 6.06 0 0 0.01 1720
NEO 0.02 0.11 0 3.51 0 0 0 1697
LO 39.82 18.94 3 97.8 25.34 38.17 52.22 1708
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the entire data used for the study.
The sample comprises 213 UK FTSE 350 firms over the period 2007 to 2015. The
variable descriptions are provided in Table 1 above.
Table 3.3: Correlation matrix
CB LEV SAL SZ GR ROA STk R&D PPE Z.SC EO NEO LO
CB 1.00
LEV -0.06 1.00
SAL 0.39* 0.00 1.00
SZ 0.09* -0.50* 0.12* 1.00
GR 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.11* 1.00
ROA -0.01 -0.39* -0.02 0.08* 0.01 1.00
STKR 0.09* -0.11* 0.00 -0.03 0.02 0.24* 1.00
R&D 0.00 -0.12* -0.05 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.03 1.00
PPE -0.07* 0.09* 0.05 0.22* -0.03 0 -0.06 -0.08* 1.00
Z-SC -0.04 -0.52* -0.08* 0.27* 0.02 0.79* 0.16* 0.04 0.00 1.00
EO -0.05 0.00 -0.09* 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.04 0.00 0.06 -0.05 1.00
NEO -0.07* 0.00 -0.11* 0.00 0.02 -0.09* -0.02 -0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.56* 1.00
LO -0.18* -0.02 -0.43* -0.03 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 0.10* 0.03 0.29* 0.21* 1.00
This table presents the correlation matrix for the sample data. The sample and variable definitions are as described in Table
1. * indicates significance at 1% levels.
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Table 3.4: Managerial and firm characteristics by Leverage quartiles
Quartile 1 Quartile 4 t-test
CB 5.623 5.464 1.56
(1.425) (1.581)
SAL 6.088 6.099 -0.77
(0.213) (0.211)
SZ 9.071 8.703 5.37***
(0.737) (1.141)
GR 18.831 10.678 1.13
(146.42) (40.21)
ROA 0.122 0.045 6.35***
(0.097) (0.228)
STKR 0.117 0.006 3.51***
(-0.341) (-0.537)
R&D 0.01 0.001 4.53***
(0.041) (0.003)
PPE 0.209 0.281 -4.16***
(0.203) (0.282)
Z-SC 2.013 0.807 17.35***
(0.946) (1.098)
EO 0.041 0.038 0.42
(0.118) (0.112)
NEO 0.019 0.022 -0.53
(0.076) (0.067)
LO 41.285 39.113 1.64*
(19.93) (18.629)
t statistics in parentheses* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 are significance
at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Notes: The table above provides univariate mean
comparisons of both firm-specific and managers incentives characteristics by book leverage
(dependent variable) quartiles (normal font) and standard deviation (in square brackets).
The t-statistics show the difference of means from the first (1st) to the fourth (4th)
quartiles. The column (4) shows t-tests of whether the means of quartiles 1 and 4 differ
statistically (Ho : mean (1) mean (4) = 0; H1 : the diff 6=0). Definitions for all the
variables are shown in table 1.
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Table 3.5: Managerial cash bonus and leverage regression
Main Results Robustness Check
OLS OLS FE Predicted
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CB -0.0256*** -0.0210** -0.0148** -0.1442**
(-2.99) (-2.28) (-2.28) (-2.17)
SAL 0.0847*** 0.0838*** 0.1804***
(2.73) (2.82) (2.71)
SZ -0.0442*** -0.0340* -0.0421***
(-6.32) (-1.74) (-5.36)
GR -0.0008 0.0008 -0.0013
(-0.86) (0.93) (0.83)
ROA 0.0991 0.0853** -0.0891
(1.46) (1.95) (-1.31)
STKR -0.0134 -0.0141** 0.0043
(-1.38) (-2.42) (0.37)
R&D -0.360** 0.184* -0.4914***
(-2.17) (1.63) (-4.00)
PPE 0.0759*** 0.273*** 0.0510*
(3.2) (4.39) (1.81)
Z-SC -0.0639*** -0.0439*** -0.0661***
(-7.92) (-4.76) (-9.31)
EO 0.0576 -0.199*** 0.0391
(1.15) (-2.73) (0.84)
NEO 0.159** 0.0976 0.1094
(2.2) (1.23) (1.42)
LO -0.0005* -0.0001 -0.0003
(-1.70) (-0.44) (-1.16)
_Cons 0.437*** 0.376** 0.188 0.500***
(7.99) (2.26) (0.85) (3.21)
N 1441 1231 1231 1199
R2 0.05 0.256 0.165 0.281
The table shows the OLS, FE and Predicted estimation results of the effects of cash bonus
on leverage. All variable definitions are described in Table 1. *, ** and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Simultaneous system of equations regression of book leverage and cash bonus results. The
predicted sign for the variable of interest are shown in the book leverage model. The
models included fixed effects in all estimations. The reported t-statistics are based on
robust standard errors are within parentheses. Cash bonus (CB) model includes leverage,
controls and instruments (i.e. industry median_CB, one-year period log of ROA and
STKR). Variable definitions are described in Table 1.*, ** and *** indicate statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table 3.7: Managerial cash bonus and leverage – with ROA and Growth interaction
terms
OLS OLS OLS FE FE FE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
CB -0.0148* -0.0207** -0.0141 -0.0115* -0.0162** -0.0114*
(-1.62) (-2.22) (-1.55) (-1.74) (-2.37) (-1.72)
SAL 0.0821** 0.107*** 0.0883*** 0.0625** 0.0803** 0.0624**
(2.50) (3.38) (2.74) (2.10) (2.61) (2.10)
SZ -0.0417*** -0.0476*** -0.0441*** -0.0469** -0.0433** -0.0475**
(-4.68) (-7.18) (-5.10) (-2.40) (-2.14) (-2.43)
GR -0.001 0.0033** 0.0032** 0.0008 0.001 0.001
(-1.03) (2.37) (2.31) (1.01) (1.16) (1.21)
ROA 0.130*** 0.0994 0.128*** 0.0187 0.0626 0.019
(3.18) (1.47) (3.11) (0.42) (1.37) (0.43)
STKR -0.012 -0.0131 -0.0121 -0.0076 -0.0132** -0.0076
(-1.22) (-1.32) (-1.23) (-1.31) (-2.20) (-1.30)
R&D -0.340** -0.332** -0.342** 0.174 0.184 0.173
(-2.13) (-2.03) (-2.14) (1.58) (1.61) (1.57)
PPE 0.0741*** 0.0694*** 0.0739*** 0.231*** 0.264*** 0.231***
(3.06) (2.80) (3.05) (3.72) (4.11) (3.71)
Z-SC -0.0581*** -0.0629*** -0.0576*** -0.0257*** -0.0378*** -0.0257***
(-7.17) (-7.65) (-7.18) (-2.73) (-3.92) (-2.72)
EO 0.0781 0.0598 0.0766 -0.155** -0.207*** -0.156**
(1.5) (1.17) (1.46) (-2.16) (-2.80) (-2.18)
NEO 0.180** 0.163** 0.179** 0.113 0.0946 0.11
(2.57) (2.2) (2.56) (1.45) (1.18) (1.41)
LO -0.0005* -0.0005 -0.0005* -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001
(-1.63) (-1.46) (-1.65) (-0.39) (-0.59) (-0.38)
CB x ROA -0.0443*** -0.0449*** -0.0526*** -0.0519***
(-4.93) (-4.97) (-8.51) (-8.36)
CB x GR -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0005* -0.0003
(-4.88) (-5.01) (-1.65) (-0.94)
_Cons 0.341** 0.271 0.328* 0.423* 0.297 0.431**
(1.99) (1.57) (1.92) (1.91) (1.30) (1.94)
N 1165 1167 1165 1165 1167 1165
R2 0.257 0.257 0.263 0.215 0.158 0.215
The table presents the OLS and FE estimation results for the interaction effects of cash
bonus, ROA and Growth opportunities on leverage. Models 1, 2 and 3 include firm fixed
effect. Time dummies are included in all estimations. The reported t-statistics are based
on robust standard errors. All variable definitions are described in Table 1.*, ** and ***
indicate statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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